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I. Abstract  
A  resurgent  Russia  and  the  threat  of  extremist  ideology  are  two  major  topics  currently  facing  the  
international  community.  For  Russia,  both  issues  have  arisen  simultaneously  within  the  Russian  
republic  of  Chechnya.  While  the  breakup  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  1991  triggered  calls  for  
independence  among  various  groups  in  Russia,  the  case  of  the  Chechen  Republic  can  reveal  
unique  characteristics  of  Russia’s  perspective  on  its  domestic  and  international  security  position.  
This  thesis  aims  to  emphasize  the  importance  of  the  impact  of  the  Chechen  Wars  on  the  
evolution  of  Russia’s  security  perspective.  I  will  show  that  Russia’s  experiences  with  Chechnya  
in  the  First  and  Second  Chechen  Wars  have  influenced  its  attitudes  towards  security  on  both  a  
domestic  and  international  scale.  My  thesis  will  add  to  the  discussion  on  Russia’s  security  
evolution  by  bringing  the  case  of  Chechnya  as  an  additional  element  to  be  used  in  the  analysis  of  
Russia’s  perspective  of  itself,  thereby  adding  to  scholarship  on  the  shaping  of  modern  Russia.   
  
The  following  thesis,  broken  up  into  four  sections,  will  discuss  the  lessons  learned  by  Russia  
throughout  the  Chechen  Wars.  It  will  also  analyze  the  ways  in  which  the  lessons  from  Chechnya  
have  been  applied  to  specific  events,  or  to  the  trajectory  of  Russia  more  generally,  both  
domestically  and  internationally.  Throughout,  I  argue  that  Russia’s  experiences  with  Chechnya  
have  played  a  key  role  in  shaping  Russia’s  current  security  mentality.  While  the  lessons  learned  
from  Chechnya  are  the  basis  of  my  argument,  I  include  circumstantial  points  that  reference  
Russia’s  vulnerability  as  a  new  nation,  as  well  as  the  rise  of  Vladimir  Putin.  As  a  result,  I  will  
also  challenge  current  scholarship  that  has  downplayed  Chechnya  as  a  central  component  in  the  
development  of  Russia’s  modern  security  strategy.  As  a  disclaimer,  my  paper  does  not  seek  to  
address  all  components  of  Russian  security  perspectives,  strategy,  or  of  the  Chechen  conflicts.  
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Rather,  it  offers  a  unique  lens  upon  which  to  view  Russian  perspectives  on  domestic  and  foreign  
security.  In  attempts  to  construct  a  concise  argument,  not  all  of  the  necessary  elements  of  the  
Chechen  conflict  or  its  impact  can  be  addressed.  However,  the  essence  of  my  thesis  paper  will  be  
to  argue  that,  by  better  understanding  Chechnya’s  history  with  Russia,  it  is  possible  to  better  
understand  Russia.   
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III. Introduction  
The  republic  of  Chechnya  has  endured  a  tumultuous  history,  rooted  in  its  struggle  for  national  
identity.  As  primarily  mountain-dwelling  people  accustomed  to  harsh  living  conditions  and  
difficult  manual  labor,  the  Chechen  people  have  struggled  as  an  ethnic,  religious,  and  geographic  
minority  under  the  rule  of  the  dominant  presence  of  the  Soviet  Union,  later  turned  Russian  
Federation.  Chechnya’s  strategic  location  on  the  outer  edges  of  Russia  and  within  the  rugged  
Caucasus  mountains  served  to  dramatize  the  events  that  unfolded  between  it  and  the  regime  in  
Moscow.  The  dissolution  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  1991  initially  sparked  the  subsequent  violence  
that  erupted  in  Chechnya  in  the  years  following.  The  Chechens’  dissatisfaction  with  their  
territorial  status  resulting  from  the  breakup  of  the  USSR  further  emboldened  their  rebellion  
against  Russia.  The  Chechens  claimed  that,  due  to  the  granting  of  autonomy  to  other  states  
formerly  a  part  of  the  USSR,  Chechnya  had  a  legitimate  right  to  autonomy,  as  had  been  granted  
to  other  nations  that  had  separated  from  Russia. 1   
  
The  First  and  Second  Chechen  Wars,  as  they  are  now  referred  to,  took  place  between  1994-1996  
and  1999-2009,  respectively.  They  are  of  particular  interest  to  academics  and  experts  of  Russian  
history,  as  the  conflicts  constitute  the  first  major  domestic  conflict  endured  by  the  newly  formed  
Russian  Federation.  Here,  the  Chechen  Wars  serve  as  case  studies  for  a  broader  analysis  of  
security  studies  and  Russian  security.  Among  the  conflicts,  the  choices  by  both  the  regimes  in  
Grozny  and  Moscow,  helped  shape  the  modern  Russian  outlook  on  security  by  helping  instill  
within  it  a  sense  of  constant  caution  and  hostility  which  have  characterized  much  of  Russia’s  
relationship  with  the  Western  Hemisphere  over  the  past  few  decades.  In  particular,  the  reaction  
1  Fiona  Hill,  Russia's  Tinderbox.  Conflict  in  the  North  Caucasus  and  Its  Implications  for  the  Future  of  the  Russian  
Federation ,  p.  67  
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and  behaviors  in  the  direct  aftermath  of  the  Chechen  Wars,  from  the  Russian  perspective,  are  
looked  at  closely  and  compared  with  more  recent  examples  of  Russian  domestic  response  to  
security  matters.   
  
By  analyzing  the  main  events  of  the  Chechen  Wars,  it  is  possible  to  identify  similarities  between  
Russia’s  experiences  with  Chechnya  and  its  behaviors  in  the  realm  of  domestic  and  foreign  
security  policy.  In  a  time  where  understanding  Russia’s  foreign  policy  motives  are  critically  
important  in  preempting  and  de-escalating  hostile  actions  against  other  actors,  both  regionally  
and  globally,  Chechnya  may  serve  as  the  key  to  unlocking  part  of  the  mystery  of  the  Russian  
security  mindset.   
  
  
Chechnya,  outlined  in  red,  and  surrounding  areas 2   
  
2  “Chechnya  -  Чеченская  Республика,  Russia”,  Google  Maps,  March  22,  2021  
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A. Literature  Review   
There  is  an  abundant  amount  of  literature  covering  the  topic  of  Chechnya,  Russia,  and  the  First  
and  Second  Chechen  Wars.  The  distinction  comes  when  searching  for  discussions  of  Chechen  
impact  on  Russia,  specifically  from  a  security  perspective.  While  I  had  trouble  finding  much  
content  about  the  specific  role  that  Chechnya  had  in  shaping  modern  Russian  security  
perspective  and  strategy,  the  amalgamation  of  resources  I  was  able  to  find  that  discussed  the  
history,  relations,  and  implications  of  the  Chechen-Russian  relationship  was  significant.  In  
combining  the  literature  on  Chechnya  and  Russia  with  that  of  Russian  security  in  the  post-Cold  
War  era,  I  have  been  able  to  achieve  a  high  level  of  understanding  of  the  ways  in  which  
Chechnya  helped  shape  contemporary  Russian  security  perspectives.  In  my  literature  review,  I  
aim  to  consolidate  the  elements  from  existing  research,  add  context,  and  identify  the  useful  
takeaways  from  each.  
  
John  B.  Dunlop’s  historical  account  of  the  evolution  of  the  Chechen  people  in  his  book,  Russia  
Confronts  Chechnya  3 ,  is  a  concise  recollection  of  events  that  make  up  Chechnya’s  history,  
especially  as  it  relates  to  its  turbulent  past  with  the  Russian  Empire  and  the  Soviet  Union.  While  
the  book  is  rarely  mentioned  in  the  following  pages,  the  book,  nonetheless,  can  be  viewed  as  a  
paramount  text  in  the  broader  scope  of  academia  in  Russian  and  Chechen  history.  In  many  ways,  
the  book  serves  as  the  backbone  of  this  thesis,  as  well  as  a  constant  reminder  of  the  importance  
of  history  in  any  contemporary  discussion.  
  
Julie  Wilhelmsen  presents  the  unique  character  of  the  “Russian  self”  in  her  book  The  
Securitization  of  Chechnya:  How  War  Became  Acceptable  4 .  She  outlines  the  significance  of  
justification  and  unity  in  the  Russian  mindset,  particularly  in  the  context  of  the  second  invasion  
into  Chechnya  in  1999.  The  event,  framed  as  a  “counterterrorism  campaign”  to  the  Russian  
citizen,  is  a  lesson  in  Russian  domestic  politics  that  illustrates  that  with  any  act  of  aggression  
must  come  the  presentation  of  an  honorable  purpose.   
  
Fiona  Hill’s  report  Russia’s  Tinderbox:  Conflict  in  the  North  Caucasus  And  its  Implications  for  
The  Future  of  the  Russian  Federation  5 ,  outlines  the  various  factors  that  played  a  part  in  sparking  
conflict  in  the  North  Caucasus  in  detail.  Ethnic  tensions,  strategic  economic  and  geopolitical  
location,  and  power  imbalances  all  played  a  role  in  the  outbreak  of  the  first  Chechen  War.  
3  John  Dunlop,  Russia  Confronts  Chechnya:  Roots  of  a  Separatist  Conflict ,  1998  
4  Julie  Wilhelmsen,  Russia's  Securitization  of  Chechnya:  How  War  Became  Acceptable ,  2017  
5  Fiona  Hill,  Russia's  Tinderbox.  Conflict  in  the  North  Caucasus  and  Its  Implications  for  the  Future  of  the  Russian  
Federation, 1995  
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Furthermore,  the  report  details  shortcomings  of  the  new  Russian  Federation  in  handling  the  
Chechen  problem,  and  helps  emphasize  the  security  mindset  of  Russia  while  on  the  verge  of  the  
first  conflict.   
  
Russia's  Restless  Frontier:  The  Chechnya  Factor  in  Post-Soviet  Russia 6   is  a  book  written  by  
Dmitriĭ  Trenin  and  Anatol  Lieven  that  discusses  Russia’s  takeaways  from  its  conflicts  with  
Chechnya  from  a  military  standpoint.  It  is  used  in  the  discussion  of  the  “lessons  learned”  from  
Chechnya  to  emphasize  the  shift  in  military  strategy  and  adaptation  of  Russian  strategic  
thinking  in  the  events  that  followed  the  conflicts  with  Chechnya.  
  
Security  in  Translation:  Securitization  Theory  and  the  Localization  of  Threat 7   by  Holger  Stritzel  
traces  the  evolution  of  ideas  about,  meanings  and  connotations  of,  and  social  implications  of  the  
concept  of  security.  It  offers  general  guidance  on  the  history  of  securitization  theory  and  terms  
central  to  the  thesis,  like  “security”  and  “threat”,  and  provides  a  lens  with  which  to  view  the  
security  and  threat  environment  of  the  post-Cold  War  era.  Though  the  book  is  not  cited  in  the  
thesis,  it  should  be  considered  an  authoritative  source  on  the  linguistic  importance  of  key  terms  
and  concepts  within  the  field  of  security.  
  
Hanna  Notte’s  article  in  Middle  East  Policy  Journal,  Russia  in  Chechnya  and  Syria:  Pursuit  of  
Strategic  Goals 8 ,  discusses  the  impact  of  the  Chechen  Wars  on  Russia’s  policy  regarding  Syria  
and  the  wider  Middle  East.  Notte  outlines  how  Russia’s  narrative  of  a  counterterrorism  campaign  
against  Chechnya  impacted  its  attitudes  towards  terrorism  and  politics  within  the  region,  
including  the  complex  relationship  with  the  Assad  regime.  Particularly  in  a  post  9/11  context,  
Notte  highlights  several  opportunities  for  US-Russia  cooperation  based  on  case  studies  that  
include  Slovenia  and  the  Global  War  on  Terror  (GWOT),  as  well  as  areas  for  improvement.  
  
In  his  report,  Russia’s  Threat  Perceptions  and  Strategic  Posture 9 ,  Dmitriĭ  Trenin  discusses  
Russian  perceptions  of  its  security  environment  in  the  post-Cold  War  era.  He  gives  reasons  for  
shifts  or  continuations  in  Russian  domestic  and  foreign  policy,  with  Trenin  mentioning  the  value  
of  Chechnya  in  shaping  Russian  perceptions.  Trenin  goes  on  to  identify  and  classify  Russia’s  
perceived  threats  through  a  strategic  and  security  lens.  The  report  is  used  to  support  the  claim  of  
the  significance  of  Chechnya  in  shaping  regional  domestic  and  foreign  policy,  as  well  as  a  source  
6  Alekseĭ  Malashenko,  Dmitriĭ  Trenin,  and  Anatol  Lieven,  Russia's  Restless  Frontier:  The  Chechnya  Factor  in  
Post-Soviet  Russia ,  2004  
7  Holger  Stritzel,  Security  in  Translation:  Securitization  Theory  and  the  Localization  of  Threat ,  2014  
8  Hanna  Notte,  "Russia  in  Chechnya  and  Syria:  Pursuit  of  Strategic  Goals",  2016  
9  Dmitriĭ  Trenin,  Russian  Security  Strategy  under  Putin:  Russia's  Threat  Perception  and  Strategic  Posture ,  2007  
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to  begin  analyzing  Putin  and  Russia’s  collective  objectives  through  the  process  of  
“Chechenization”.  
  
In  her  book,  Russia's  Security  Policy  under  Putin 10 ,  Aglaya  Snetkov  uses  Chechnya  as  a  case  
study  for  the  development  of  Russian  Security  Policy  under  the  Putin  and  Medvedev  regime.  
Having  drawn  directly  from  Russian  primary  sources,  Snetkov  is  able  to  articulate  the  ways  in  
which  Chechnya  came  to  represent  Russia’s  greater  identity  crisis,  and  later,  a  story  of  success  
that  guided  Russia’s  perceptions  of  its  own  security  position  as  well  as  future  courses  of  action.  
The  book  provides  a  look  at  the  making  of  Russian  contemporary  domestic  and  foreign  policy  
under  Putin,  while  simultaneously  providing  a  deeper  understanding  of  Chechnya’s  significance.  
As  it  is  the  only  source  that  provides  substantial  ties  between  Chechnya  and  its  implications  on  
Russian  security,  it  is  drawn  upon  heavily.   
  
Francis  Naylor’s  Geography  of  Asymmetrical  Conflict:  Geographic  Perception  in  Post  Chechen  
War  Ingushetia 11   focuses  on  the  perceptions  of  those  living  in  Ingushetia  during  the  
post-Chechen  War,  War  in  Ingushetia  timeframe.  Naylor  emphasizes  the  role  of  the  Chechen  
conflict  in  shaping  the  government  response  and  counterinsurgency  effort  in  Ingushetia.  This  
source  is  used  to  discuss  the  implications  of  the  Chechen  Wars  on  Russian  domestic  security  
strategy  in  the  following  years  .  
  
Emil  Souleimanov’s  T he  North  Caucasus  Insurgency:  Dead  or  Alive? 12   examines  the  causal  
factors  and  status  (as  of  2017)  of  the  weakening  Insurgency  of  the  North  Caucasus,  which  began  
immediately  following  the  end  of  the  Second  Chechen  War.  Souleimanov  discusses  adaptations  
of  Russian  military  strategy  as  a  result  of  Chechnya,  which  are  used  to  showcase  the  
implementation  of  the  lessons  learned  from  Chechnya  in  Russian  domestic  events.   
  
Dr.  Fiona  Hill  is  an  acclaimed  foreign  affairs  and  national  security  expert  with  subject-matter  
expertise  on  Europe  and  Russia.  She  has  served  in  many  notable  positions  in  her  field,  including  
as  a  member  of  the  US  National  Security  Council,  though  she  now  works  as  a  senior  fellow  at  
the  Brookings  Institution.  In  my  interview  with  Dr.  Fiona  Hill,  I  asked  explicitly  about  the  role  of  
the  Chechen  conflicts  on  both  Russia  and  Putin.  As  the  two  have  become  somewhat  
synonymous,  especially  in  recent  years,  I  felt  it  necessary  to  identify  the  similarities  and  
10  Aglaya  Snetkov,  Russia's  Security  Policy  under  Putin ,  2014  
11  Francis  Naylor,  Geography  of  Asymmetrical  Conflict:  Geographic  Perception  in  Post  Chechen  War  Ingushetia ,  
2014  
12  Emil  Souleimanov,  "The  North  Caucasus  Insurgency:  Dead  or  Alive?",  2017  
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differences  among  the  perceptions  of  each.  Although  Dr.  Hill  affirmed  the  categorization  of  the  
“lessons  learned”  from  Chechnya  on  a  high  level,  she  challenged  the  novelty  of  Russia’s  policy  
shifts  in  the  context  of  greater  Russian  and  Soviet  history.  Overall,  I  came  away  from  the  
interview  with  a  more  nuanced  understanding  of  the  ways  in  which  this  important  event  was  both  
monumental  and,  in  other  respects,  a  continuation  of  historical  strategy  simply  shaped  to  fit  a  
new  framework. 13   
  
Maura  Reynolds  is  currently  a  distinguished  reporter  and  senior  editor  for  POLITICO,  where  she  
writes  primarily  on  issues  of  Russian  affairs.  In  2001,  Reynolds  was  a  finalist  for  the  Pulitzer  
Prize  for  her  on-the-ground  reporting  of  the  First  Chechen  War.  In  my  interview  with  Maura  
Reynolds,  I  dug  into  the  most  significant  mistakes  made  by  Russia  during  the  First  Chechen  War,  
and  how  those  mistakes  played  out  domestically  in  post-Chechen  War  Russia.  We  also  discussed  
existing  misconceptions  of  Russia  which  has  led  to  its  tumultuous  relationship  with  the  West.  
Primarily,  this  interview  was  used  to  strengthen  the  foundations  of  Part  I  and  Part  IV  used  in  the  
recommendations  section  of  this  thesis. 14   
  
Resetting  Transatlantic  Relations 15   is  a  lecture  given  by  Dr.  Fiona  Hill,  in  partnership  with  
former  High  Representative  of  the  European  Union  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy  
Frederica  Mogherini,  in  October  2020  about  the  obstacles  facing  the  Transatlantic  relationship  
between  the  United  States  and  Europe.  Framed  in  the  context  of  the  post-WWII,  Cold  War  era,  
Hill  presents  a  contemporary  picture  of  the  global  threats  facing  the  partnership,  including  
climate  change,  the  ongoing  pandemic,  terrorism,  and  decaying  diplomatic  relationships  between  
the  US  and  Europe,  the  EU,  NATO,  and  Russia.  She  addresses  the  most  pressing  questions  on  the  
transatlantic  relationships,  Western  institutions,  and  Russia,  and  outlines  pathways  for  dealing  
with  such  issues  in  the  future.  This  lecture  is  used  to  discuss  recommendations  and  pathways  
forward  for  the  Western  relationship  with  Russia.  
  
The  Putin  Profile:  A  Conversation  with  Dr.  Fiona  Hill  16   is  a  July  2020  interview  conducted  with  
Fiona  Hill  by  the  Wilson  Institute’s  Kennan  Center.  The  conversation  consisted  of  Hill’s  thoughts  
about  the  current  trajectory  of  the  Russian  Federation,  as  well  as  that  of  President  Vladimir  
Putin.  The  interview  gave  some  insight  into  the  inner  thoughts  of  Putin  and  his  nuanced  
decision-making  process,  as  well  as  some  of  the  greatest  obstacles  facing  the  US-Russia  
13  Fiona  Hill,  Personal  interview,  12  March  2021.  
14  Maura  Reynolds ,  Personal  interview,  19  March  2021.  
15  “High-Level  Transatlantic  Lecture  by  Fiona  Hill:  ‘Resetting  Transatlantic  Relations’”,  College  of  Europe  on  
YouTube,  2020  
16  “The  Putin  Profile:  A  Conversation  with  Dr.  Fiona  Hill”,  The  Woodrow  Wilson  Center  on  YouTube,  2020  
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relationship.  It  included  various  suggestions,  with  an  emphasis  on  the  United  States,  for  steps  to  
improve  the  relationship.  The  interview  is  mainly  utilized  in  the  final  section  of  the  thesis,  which  
addresses  recommendations  for  moving  forward  with  Russia,  as  well  as  ways  to  decrease  overall  
aggression  and  hostility  between  Russia  and  the  West.  
  
In  addition  to  Dr.  Hill’s  above  lectures,  articles  from  The  Atlantic  Council 17 ,  the  Council  on  
Foreign  Relations 18 ,  the  European  Council  on  Foreign  Relations 19 ,  Brookings  Institution 20 ,  and  
NATO 21   are  used  to  facilitate  the  discussion  of  contemporary  West-Russia  relations.  In  
conjunction  with  arguments  of  Chechnya’s  significance,  the  articles  are  used  to  showcase  the  















17  Alexander  Vershbow  and  Daniel  Fried,  "How  the  West  Should  Deal  with  Russia",  Atlantic  Council  
18  Jonathan  Masters  and  Stephen  Sestanovich,  "What's  Next  for  Russia's  Relations  With  the  West?",  2018  
19  Kadri  Liik,  “The  Last  of  the  Offended:  Russia's  First  Post-Putin  Diplomats”,  2019  
20  Jesse  Kornbluth,  "Highlights:  Navigating  US-Russia  Relations  in  2020  and  beyond”,  2020  
21  NATO,  “NATO  -  Topic:  Relations  with  Russia”,  2020  
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IV. Lessons  from  Chechnya  
One  of  the  primary  arguments  of  this  thesis  is  that  Russia  took  away  several  significant  lessons  
from  its  dealings  with  Chechnya  that  have  both  uniquely  impacted  domestic  and  foreign  policy  
and  helped  shape  the  persona  of  what  is  today’s  Russian  Federation.  While  the  lessons  are  
complex,  their  impacts  are  straightforward,  having  clear  implications  on  the  Russia  that  came  out  
of  the  conflicts.  To  be  clear,  it  cannot  be  forgotten  that  all  of  Russia’s  history  has  helped  shape  it  
in  some  way,  since  most  agree  that  much  of  contemporary  Russian  behavior  dates  to  events  in  its  
Soviet  and  Imperial  past. 22   However,  it  is  nonetheless  important  to  identify  pivot  points  that  may  
have  had  greater  weight  in  shaping  Russia’s  collective  security  mindset.  The  significance  of  
Chechnya  is  compounded  by  its  status  as  the  first  domestic  conflict  within  Russia  after  the  
dissolution  of  the  USSR,  and  that  the  First  Chechen  War  ended  in  a  rare  Russian  military  defeat.  
The  traumatic  nature  of  the  defeat  in  the  first  war  amplified  the  impact  on  Russia.  While  they  
will  be  addressed  individually,  the  primary  lessons  learned  from  Chechnya  are  as  follows:  
  
1. The  importance  of  preventing  opposition  or  dissent  from  spreading  
2. The  importance  of  justification  for  actions  taken  by  the  state  
3. The  turbulent  nature  of  division,  and  the  security  of  unity  
4. The  importance  of  coherent  strategy,  including  strong  leadership  
 
The  importance  of  preventing  opposition  or  dissent  from  spreading  
In  the  case  of  Chechnya,  little  to  no  active  measures  were  taken  to  quell  dissent  before  the  First  
Chechen  War.  A  lack  of  organizational  structure  or  unified  policy  regarding  the  handling  of  
ethnic  minorities  characterized  the  old  USSR  and  carried  over  to  the  Russian  Federation  in  its  
22  Olga  Oliker,  Christopher  S.  Chivvis ,  Keith  Crane,  Olesya  Tkacheva,  Scott  Boston,  Russian  Foreign  Policy  in  
Historical  and  Current  Context:  A  Reassessment  
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early  years.  The  general  lack  of  direction  led  to  the  government  in  Moscow’s  inability  to  keep  
tabs  on  the  events  unfolding  in  Chechnya  and  intervening  early  and  can  be  considered  a  major  
failure  by  the  government  at  the  time. 23   Once  the  inevitability  of  intervention  hit,  the  chaos  that  
ensued  with  Chechnya  enveloped  the  attention  of  Moscow,  who  then  missed  other  ethnic  
conflicts  that  had  been  sparked  as  a  sort  of  “domino  effect”.  Regional  tensions  had  long  existed  
before  the  Chechen  conflict,  but  the  scale  of  the  violence  that  erupted  between  it  and  Russia  sent 
a  clear  message  of  the  disaster  that  could  unfold  when  a  dissatisfied  and  increasingly  destitute  
population  revolted  against  the  government. 24   The  death  toll  resulting  from  the  Chechen  Wars,  
especially  civilian,  far  exceeded  that  of  any  other  domestic  conflicts  at  the  time,  with  Russian  
losses  amounting  to  approximately  6000. 25   Dissent,  and  the  lessons  associated  with  it,  are  evident  
in  the  human  cost  of  the  wars,  as  well  as  the  overall  destruction  caused  by  the  level  of  violence  
that  took  place  in  the  conflicts.   
  
Chechnya’s  declaration  of  secession  from  Russia  in  November  1991,  believing  it  had  the  same  
rights  as  those  of  union  republics, 26   set  off  a  series  of  events  by  other  North  Caucasus  groups  to  
assert  their  own  autonomy.  North  Ossetia  formed  a  National  Guard,  Ingushetia  sought  its  own  
autonomy  and  formed  militias,  and  the  region  began  rapidly  arming  in  a  way  that  can  be  
attributed  to  Chechnya’s  first  major  attempt  at  independence.  Russia’s  attempt  to  reassert  control  
over  the  region  came  in  the  form  of  a  July  1992  law  preventing  territorial  changes.  Many  groups  
in  the  region,  however,  came  to  see  the  action  as  a  betrayal,  and  served  to  inflame  tensions  
23  Fiona  Hill,  Russia's  Tinderbox.  Conflict  in  the  North  Caucasus  and  Its  Implications  for  the  Future  of  the  Russian  
Federation ,  pp.  16,  19,  32,  83  
24  Trenin,  Malashenko,  and  Lieven,  Russia's  Restless  Frontier ,  p.  56  
25  Robert  M.  Cassidy,  Russia  in  Afghanistan  and  Chechnya:  Military  Strategic  Culture  and  the  Paradoxes  of  
Asymmetric  Conflict ,  p.  48  
26  Ibid.,  pp.  10,  62  
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between  the  peoples  of  the  North  Caucasus  and  the  Russian  Federation. 27   Even  in  the  beginning  
of  the  first  war,  the  Russian  reaction  in  Chechnya  became  an  indicator  for  Russian  response  to  
ethnic  conflict  in  the  region  or  forceful  action  against  the  will  of  the  government.  In  the  case  of  
the  North  Ossetia-Ingushetia  conflict,  Russian  response  had  been  “conditioned  by  the  secession  
of  Chechnya”. 28   From  that  point  on,  Russia  acted  in  a  timely  manner  against  groups  that  sought  
to  destabilize  the  North  Caucasus,  likely  to  correct  for  the  tumultuously  slow  start  that  
characterized  the  lead  up  to  the  first  war.   
  
Although,  by  no  means  the  only  group  disgruntled  with  Russia’s  refusal  to  grant  increased  levels 
of  independence,  Chechnya’s  decision  to  secede  became  the  catalyst  for  the  descent  of  the  entire  
region  into  chaos.  Russia  had  been  able  to  trace  its  headaches  within  the  region  to  Chechnya  and  
have  taken  steps  since  the  conflict  to  assure  that  independence-based  uprisings  are  not  repeated.  
For  instance,  one  need  not  look  further  than  the  Second  Chechen  War,  where  Russia  invaded  
Chechnya  as,  one  could  argue,  a  preemptive  measure  from  the  point  of  view  of  Moscow.  
Chechnya’s  importance,  in  another  sense,  stems  from  its  role  as  a  catalyst  to  other  conflicts  of  the  
North  Caucasus  largely  due  to  structural  issues  within  the  government,  as  well  as  a  lack  of  
attention  to  a  developing  opposition  force.  As  a  result,  The  Chechen  secessionist  movement  
successfully  gained  a  following  capable  of  going  head-to-head  with  the  regime  in  Moscow.  
Learning  from  their  Chechen  mistakes,  Russia  has  become  notorious  for  quelling  opposition,  
whether  by  actively  hunting  opposition  leaders  or  former  officials  in  other  countries, 29   arresting  
27  Ibid.,  p.  37  
28  Ibid.,  p.  38  
29  “Alexei  Navalny:  'Poisoned'  Russian  Opposition  Leader  in  a  Coma”,  BBC  News  
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individuals  upon  their  arrival  on  Russian  soil,  or  making  sure  that  threatening  figures  to  the  
regime  disappear. 30    
  
The  importance  of  justification  for  actions  taken  by  the  state  
Chechen  stereotypes  began  to  develop  based  on  the  early-1990s  conditions  within  Chechnya  due  
to  economic  struggles,  bad  leadership,  high  unemployment,  and  collapse  of  educational  and  
health  care  institutions  in  Chechnya.  Anti-Chechnya  policies  by  Moscow  contributed  to  the  
perpetuation  of  such  stereotypes,  fostering  increased  feelings  of  resentment  and  hostility  towards  
Chechens.  The  “Chechen  Problem”  originated  from  the  increasing  rates  of  lawlessness  occurring  
in  Chechnya  and  the  criminal  activities  that  became  rampant  as  a  result.  The  banditry,  with  roots  
in  Chechen  national  struggle,  would  expand  into  a  more  sinister  form  of  retaliation  that  would  
help  set  the  stage  for  Russian  legitimization  of  violent  acts  committed  in  Chechnya.  Russia,  
concerned  with  its  hold  on  authority,  utilized  the  press  to  control  narratives  and,  therefore,  the  
wider  domestic  population.   
  
Between  the  first  and  second  conflicts,  Russia’s  relationship  with  the  media  shifted  noticeably.  
Despite  popular  assumptions,  the  timeframe  leading  up  to,  and  during,  the  first  conflict  marked  a  
period  of  relative  freedom  for  the  media. 31   Far  from  the  clear  suppression  that  exists  today,  
Russia’s  pre-Chechen  War  media  became  a  hopeful  example  of  what  modern-day  Russian  
society  could  be.  Unfortunately,  as  the  events  in  Chechnya  unfolded  and  dissent  mounted,  the  
media’s  privileged  position  prevented  Russia  from  conducting  operations  effectively.  Even  more  
concerning,  the  press  inhibited  Russia  from  pushing  forth  the  narrative  necessary  to  win  over  the  
30  “Defining  Forced  Disappearance”,  Forced  Disappearances  in  Chechnya,  Human  Rights  Watch  (HRW)  
31  Trenin,  Malashenko,  and  Lieven,  “ Russia's  Restless  Frontier ”,  p.  18  
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Russian  people.  The  Chechen  Problem,  therefore,  became  a  threat  in  terms  of  not  only  territorial  
endangerment,  but  also  of  a  broader  vulnerability  to  internal  criticism  by  the  press  that  placed  
Russia  on  even  higher  alert.  In  the  second  conflict,  Russia’s  control  of  the  media  shifted  
considerably,  resulting  in  high  approval  ratings  of  the  war. 32   Russia,  of  course,  also  had  an  
interest  in  minimizing  its  own  losses  and  shortcomings,  though  this  is  not  significant  for  the  
analysis  of  the  conflict,  as  such  behavior  is  typical  of  many  states  in  wartime.  The  shift  in  media  
coverage,  however,  between  the  first  and  second  Chechen  conflicts  was  a  clear  maneuver  aimed  
at  controlling  a  narrative  that  could  be  used  to  gain  the  support  of  the  people,  thereby  ensuring  
multifaceted  Russian  success  -  militarily,  politically,  and  socially.   
  
In  her  book,  Dr.  Julie  Wilhelmsen  presents  the  idea  of  the  “Russian  self,”  a  metaphorical  persona  
unifying  the  Russian  subcontinent  into  a  single  living,  breathing  entity  with  human-like  features.  
From  an  international  relations  perspective,  the  concept  is  not  so  unusual,  given  that  countries  
run  by  leaders  and  citizens  take  on  almost-human  qualities.  Dr.  Wilhelmsen  stresses  the  
importance  of  not  only  Russia’s  view  of  itself,  but  its  concern  with  how  it  is  perceived  to  the  
outside  world.  The  Russian  “self”,  as  Wilhelmsen  writes,  is  further  solidified  by  the  Chechen  
Wars,  particularly  the  second.  Presented  as  a  counterterrorism  campaign,  the  Second  Chechen  
War  serves  to  underline  the  fact  that  countries  often  utilize  conflict  to  support  their  own  vision  of  
themselves,  almost  always  in  a  positive  manner. 33   Of  course,  this  is  not  a  unique  feature  to  
Russia,  as  parallels  can  be  drawn  with  almost  every  other  nation  in  the  world  which  has  engaged  
in  conflict,  whether  domestic  or  international.  In  fact,  this  phenomenon  is  not  exclusive  to  states,  
as  it  is  an  innately  human  quality  that  characterizes  individuals,  groups,  and  nations.   
32  Olga  Oliker,  “Russia's  Chechen  Wars  1994-2000:  Lessons  from  Urban  Combat”,  2001  




Russia’s  purpose  for  classifying  the  conflict  as  a  counterterrorism  operation  is  as  follows:  in  
doing  so,  Russia  gained  popular  support  for  the  campaign,  thereby  avoiding  dissent  or  negative  
consequences  in  its  courses  of  action,  while  simultaneously  promoting  the  positive  perspectives  
that  unified  and  boosted  morale  of  the  entire  ethnic-Russian  population.  Importantly,  the  
justification  itself  had  validity  given  that  terrorist  attacks  had  occurred  outside  of  Chechnya,  
giving  the  claim  the  believability  necessary  to  garner  widespread  support.  For  example,  both  the  
attack  on  Bidonovsk  (1995)  and  Kizlyar–Pervomayskoye  (1996)  included  hostage  crises  which  
terrified  and  angered  the  Russian  population . 34   Crises  like  Bidonovsk  and  
Kizlyar- Pervomayskoye  laid  the  groundwork  for  Russia’s  future  attacks  on  Chechnya.  The  
support  Russia  garnered  as  a  result  of  the  crises  aided  in  justifying  its  cause  against  the  Chechens  
and  solidified  the  Chechnya  as  a  “problem”  in  need  of  a  solution.  
  
  Indeed,  the  metaphorical  lines  differentiating  Chechen  nationalism  of  the  first  war  from  
Chechen  Islamic  extremism  had  been  blurred  by  the  time  of  the  second  war. 35   As  evident  by  the  
massive  bombing  campaigns  occurring  throughout  Chechnya  and  surrounding  areas  of  the  North  
Caucasus  in  the  fall  of  1999 36 ,  a  narrative  had  been  constructed  by  Russia  about  Chechnya,  even  
before  the  war,  that  had  added  to  the  legitimacy  of  such  bombardments.  Even  indiscriminate  
bombings  were  legitimized  to  some  extent  as  part  of  a  wider  campaign,  evidence  to  what  
Wilhelmsen  points  to  as  the  “linguistic  articulations”  that  helped  legitimize  Chechnya’s  
reputation  as  a  place  deserving  of  destruction. 37   Throughout  the  Second  Chechen  War,  repeated  
34  Cassidy,  Robert  M.  Russia  in  Afghanistan  and  Chechnya:  Military  Strategic  Culture  and  the  Paradoxes  of  
Asymmetric  Conflict ,  p.  45  
35  Hanna  Notte,  "Russia  in  Chechnya  and  Syria:  Pursuit  of  Strategic  Goals”,  p.  61  
36  Wilhelmsen,  pp.  188-190  
37  Ibid.,  p.  192  
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bombings  were  justified  based  on  a  narrative  that  had  already  proven  to  be  effective.  The  First  
Chechen  War  instilled  within  the  newly  named  Prime  Minister,  Vladimir  Putin,  the  lesson  that  
constructing  a  narrative  early,  and  sticking  with  it,  was  an  effective  way  to  maintain  support,  
regardless  of  the  gruesome  optics.   
  
Russia’s  justification  of  its  bombings  of  Chechnya,  which  included  various  human  rights  abuses,  
received  full  support  from  the  media  at  the  time.  Newspaper  accounts  confirmed  the  carefully  
constructed  narrative  of  Chechnya  as  a  terrorist  threat 38   and,  thus,  helped  establish  a  national  
reputation  for  the  republic  that  Putin  and  other  leaders  would  be  able  to  exploit  in  the  coming  
years.  The  media  in  Russia  has  long  played  a  role  in  its  identity,  so  the  ‘victory’  over  the  media  
was  one  that  allowed  Russia  to  continue  its  course  of  action,  as  it  could  be  assured  that  it  had  the  
people’s  confidence.   
  
It  is  now  necessary  to  briefly  discuss  the  relevance  of  Putin’s  entrance  into  the  story  at  such  a  
pivotal  moment.  Since  Putin  entered  his  Prime  Minister  role  immediately  thrust  into  a  major 
domestic  conflict,  his  first  tests  as  a  leader  came  from  Chechnya,  and  have  undoubtedly  stuck  in  
his  mind  nearly  two  decades  later.  Chechnya,  therefore,  takes  on  added  significance,  seeing  as 
the  current  leader  of  the  Russian  Federation  is  the  same  person  that  was  only  beginning  his  rise  
in  1999.  As  much  as  the  lessons  from  Chechnya  were  lessons  for  Russia,  they  were  even  more  so  
lessons  for  the  young  Prime  Minister ,  in  which  the  counter-terrorist  campaign  against  Chechnya  
“was  a  laboratory,  a  test  case  of  how  war  becomes  acceptable  in  Putin's  Russia”. 39   Putin’s  
political  rise  during  the  interlude  of  the  two  wars  remains  a  critical  component  of  the  Chechen  
38  Ibid.,  p.  149  
39  Wilhelmsen,  p.  12  
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conflicts’  significance.  The  profound  impact  of  the  conflicts  on  Putin,  including  a  tolerance  for  
chaos  in  foreign  affairs,  have  characterized  much  of  Russia’s  foreign  policy  making  in  post  
Chechen-War  Russia.  
  
In  a  personal  interview  conducted  with  national  security  and  foreign  affairs  expert  Dr.  Fiona  Hill,  
Hill  mentioned  that  Chechnya  became  a  “practice  space”  for  Russia  in  which  it  could  test  the  
effectiveness  of  its  response.  She  affirmed  the  notion  of  the  Russian  self, 40   whereby  Russia  can  
be  personified  as  an  entity  needing  to  be  fulfilled  through  affirmation  of  its  right-doing,  as  well  
as  the  wrongdoing  of  others.  This  can  be  clearly  seen  in  Russia’s  portrayal  of  Chechnya  as  “the  
other”  throughout  the  conflicts,  a  trend  which  has  continued  to  represent  Russia’s  treatment  of  an  
adversary,  especially  one  threatening  to  Russia’s  security  perception.  Justification  became  
strategically  necessary  to  maintain  support,  but  also  cognitively,  as  a  mechanism  to  feed  this  
desire  of  self-fulfillment  and  self-realization.   
  
The  turbulent  nature  of  division,  and  the  security  of  unity  
In  the  leadup  to  the  first  Chechen  conflict,  a  history  of  inequality  and  struggle  on  the  part  of  
Chechnya  and  other  Caucasian  peoples  generated  feelings  of  hostility  and  distrust  towards  ethnic  
Russians  and  the  Russian  government.  Chechnya,  uniquely,  constituted  the  first  instance  of  an  
internal  threat  to  national  sovereignty.  Following  the  breakup  of  the  USSR,  the  territorial  
vulnerability  of  the  Federation  could  still  be  felt.  Chechnya’s  exploitation  of  Russia’s  
vulnerability  exacerbated  the  threat  it  posed  to  Russia’s  already  delicate  authority  and  served  to 
widen  ethnic  and  national  divisions.  From  a  Chechen  perspective,  the  autonomy  granted  to  
former  Soviet  republics  legitimized  ongoing  calls  for  national  liberation  and  the  questioning  of  
40  Fiona  Hill.  Personal  interview.  12  March  2021.  
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its  borders.  From  a  Russian  perspective,  Chechnya’s  dissatisfaction  with  its  national  situation  
constituted  a  real  internal  threat  to  the  already  delicate  power  balance  of  the  Federation.  As  a  
result,  the  first  Chechen  conflict  can  be  considered,  more  than  anything,  a  conflict  of  authority  
and  legitimacy.   
  
While  Chechnya  sought  the  authority  and  legitimacy  through  its  own  statehood,  Moscow  sought  
to  consolidate  authority  and  legitimacy  within  its  own  newly  formed  state.  The  questioning  of  
Russian  legitimacy  and  authority  by  Chechnya  alluded  to  the  broader  issue  of  Russian  unity.  The  
messy  breakup  of  the  USSR  had  already  served  as  a  catalyst  for  unrest  in  the  region,  though  the  
level  of  frustration  in  Chechnya  boiled  over  into  a  force  impossible  to  ignore.  Thus,  the  First  
Chechen  War  threatened  the  heart  of  Russian  national  unity  from  the  inside  by  emphasizing  
ethnic  and  regional  divisions.  The  second  war  proved  to  be  a  continuation  of  the  first  in  regard  to  
the  accentuation  of  divisions  within  the  federation  but  included  an  important  reversal  in  
post-Cold  War  thinking  that  would  mark  a  change  in  Russia’s  threat  perceptions.  
  
The  Second  Chechen  War  served  to  further  instill  the  lesson  of  the  dangers  of  division.   
Along  with  the  ongoing  conflict,  Moscow  perceived  Chechnya’s  separatism  as  a  “possible  
catalyst  of  spillover  to  other  Russian  regions,”  placing  Russia  on  high  alert  and  increasing  its  
domestic  threat  perception. 41   Insofar  as  Russia  was  already  a  cautious  nation,  based  on  a  history  
of  invasions  and  an  inherited  memory  of  regional  and  global  conflict,  Chechnya’s  secessionist  
intentions  have  made  Russia  more  cautious.  Indeed,  in  a  2000  interview  for  his  biography,  Putin  
stated:  
  
41  Hanna  Notte,  "Russia  in  Chechnya  and  Syria:  Pursuit  of  Strategic  Goals”,  p.  59  
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“The  essence  of  the  ...  situation  in  the  North  Caucasus  and  in  Chechnya  ...  is  the  
continuation  of  the  collapse  of  the  USSR....  If  we  did  not  do  something  to  stop  it,  Russia  
as  a  state  in  its  current  form  would  cease  to  exist....  I  was  convinced  that  if  we  did  not  
immediately  stop  the  extremists  [in  Chechnya],  then  in  no  time  at  all  we  would  be  facing  
a  second  Yugoslavia  across  the  entire  territory  of  the  Russian  Federation  —  the  
Yugoslavization  of  Russia.”  42   
  
Drawing  parallels  with  the  case  of  Yugoslavia,  Putin  viewed  the  situation  in  Chechnya  as  a  
similar  threat  to  Russia.  Speaking  at  the  start  of  the  Second  Chechen  War,  he  made  it  clear  that  
Chechnya  was  an  internal  threat  to  Russia  posing  a  barrier  to  Russian  standard  way  of  life.  The  
Chechen  Problem,  in  the  eyes  of  Russian  leadership,  was  not  a  matter  of  politics,  but  a  question  
of  sustained  existence.  From  a  security  standpoint,  Russia’s  expressed  perception  of  itself  as  an  
isolated  state  with  few  allies  is  a  trend  that  has  roots  in  the  Chechen  response.   
  
While  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  brought  about  feelings  of  optimism  for  a  change  in  the  dynamics  
of  the  West-Russia  relationship,  the  positive  outlook  was  relatively  short  lived.  The  idea  of  
collective  security  echoed  by  both  Mikhail  Gorbachev  and  Boris  Yeltsin,  while  against  the  grain  
of  traditional  Russian  strategic  philosophy,  had  been  turned  on  its  head  by  the  time  Putin  had  
come  to  power,  primarily  due  to  “post-Cold  War  strategic  developments”  including  Chechnya. 43   
The  high  levels  of  violence  and  chaos  that  took  place  throughout  the  First  Chechen  War  may  
have  traumatized  Russia,  but  the  Russian  tolerance  for  violence  that  ensued  became  a  central  
tactic  for  Russia’s  policy  of  Chechenization. 44   Although  generally  thought  of  as  a  domestic  
42  Ibid.,  pp.  59-60  
43  Dmitriĭ  Trenin,  Russia's  Threat  Perception  and  Strategic  Posture ,  p.  35  
44  Maura  Reynolds ,  Personal  interview,  19  March  2021.  
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conflict,  the  international  underpinnings  of  the  Second  Chechen  War  regarding  the  rising  concern  
over  growing  jihadist  presence  within  Chechnya  have  likely  contributed  to  the  repudiation  of  
Gorbachev  and  Yeltsin’s  post-Cold  War  hopefulness.   
  
The  importance  of  coherent  regional  strategy,  including  strong  leadership  
Before  the  Chechen  Wars,  Russian  regional  policy  towards  the  North  Caucasus  had  lacked  clear  
organizational  structure  and  direction.  Policy  towards  the  region  had,  to  an  extent,  become  an  
amalgamation  of  directions  outlined  by  a  myriad  of  separate  institutions,  with  little  to  no  
coordination  among  them  and  none  having  final  authority. 45   Partially  a  remnant  of  the  USSR,  the  
lack  of  centralized  regional  policy  contributed  to  some  of  Russia's  hardships  leading  up  to  and  
throughout  the  conflicts.  For  instance,  Moscow’s  deployment  and  subsequent  withdrawal  of  
Russian  troops  from  Grozny,  following  an  unsuccessful  intervention  attempt,  signaled  a  clear  
lack  of  preparedness  on  the  Russian  side. 46   The  fact  that  such  an  embarrassing  showing  by  
Russia  came  so  soon  after  Chechnya’s  declaration  of  its  independence  only  prompted  more  
confidence  from  Chechen  General  Dzhokar  Dudayev  and  his  supporters,  who  later  refused  
Russian  attempts  at  negotiations.   
  
In  the  second  standoff  between  Russia  and  Chechnya  in  1992,  then-president  Yeltsin,  again,  
called  off  Russian  troops  out  of  fear  of  another  reputational  blow. 47   Another  failure  by  Yeltsin  
came  in  November  1994,  in  which  Russia’s  support  of  Chechen  opposition  resulted  in  the  
capture  of  70  Russian  servicemen,  and  the  bolstering  of  support  for  General  Dudayev. 48   While  
45  Fiona  Hill,  Russia’s  Tinderbox,  pp.  19-20  
46  Ibid.,  p,  70  
47  Ibid.,  p.  72  
48  Ibid.,  p.  74  
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further  humiliation  may  have  been  prevented,  the  damage  was  done.  Russia  had  backed  down  
from  Chechnya  again,  and  Yeltsin  had  proven  himself  to  be  a  weak  leader  in  the  eyes  of  both  his  
opponents  and,  increasingly,  his  political  allies.  As  much  as  Yeltsin’s  leadership  was  weak  
strategically,  it  was  also  weak  perceptively.  Chechnya’s  will  to  fight  and  confidence  in  its  
eventual  victory  grew  with  each  of  Russia’s  lackluster  showings.  Both  President  Yeltsin  and  the  
Russian  government  were  unprepared  for  the  kind  of  fight  the  Chechens  were  willing  to  bring,  
made  clear  by  the  simple  revelation  by  Foreign  Minister  Andrei  Kozyrev  that  “we  messed  up  in  
Chechnya.” 49   The  combination  of  weak  Russian  leadership  and  disorganized  planning  led  to  the  
humiliation  of  Russian  forces  in  the  formative  years  of  the  Russian  conflict  and,  subsequently,  
set  the  stage  for  the  informal  Chechen  victory  of  the  first  war.  
  
Here,  I  must  also  address  the  counterargument  to  my  claims  of  Yeltsin’s  weak  leadership.  It  is  
true  that,  in  the  First  Chechen  War,  President  Yeltsin  can  be  accredited  with  at  least  one  
successful  attempt,  which  came  in  December  1994,  after  the  Russian  Ministry  of  Defense  
decided  to  finally  authorize  direct  Russian  military  intervention  in  the  region  to  quell  the  
unrest. 50   The  result,  while  a  disaster  from  a  human  rights  standpoint,  did  restore  some  of  Yeltsin’s  
credibility  as  a  leader  at  a  time  when  it  had  been  falling  and  the  political  necessity  for  showing  
strength  arose.  Despite  this  comeback  for  Yeltsin,  the  success  had  come  too  late.  From  a  strategic  
standpoint,  the  failed  initial  attempts  at  handling  Chechnya  had  backfired,  and  had  already  
boosted  morale  within  the  Chechen  ranks,  and  conversely  deteriorated  that  of  Russia.  The  
importance  of  the  first  impression,  in  the  case  of  the  first  war,  was  pivotal  in  the  ultimate  
outcome.   
49  Jeremy  Azrael  and  Emil  Payin,  U.S.  and  Russian  Policymaking  With  Respect  to  the  Use  of  Force ,  1996  
50  Fiona  Hill,  Russia's  Tinderbox.  Conflict  in  the  North  Caucasus  and  Its  Implications  for  the  Future  of  the  Russian  
Federation ,  pp.  75-76 
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Even  if  Yeltsin  had  been  able  to  unify  Russian  response  during  the  course  of  the  first  war,  it  
would  have  come  too  late,  as  there  was  no  way  to  overlook  the  unprepared  state  of  the  Russian  
military  in  the  initial  phases.  The  fact  that,  by  the  end  of  the  first  war,  the  status  of  the  Russian  
Federation  had  not  yet  been  settled  only  emphasized  Russia’s  weak  leadership  and  lack  of  
strategy. 51   Even  so,  Chechnya  is  considered  the  “victor”  of  the  First  Chechen  War,  which  has  
further  compounded  Russia’s  perceived  threat  heading  into  the  second  war.  As  will  be  made  
clear  in  the  next  section,  however,  the  victory  that  had  eluded  Russia  in  the  First  Chechen  War  
did  not  repeat  itself  in  the  second;  mishaps  of  Russian  leadership  and  policy  from  that  point  on  
would  be  entirely  different.  
  
Yeltsin’s  leadership,  which  came  to  an  end  in  the  beginning  of  the  Second  Chechen  War,  gave  
rise  to  a  new  leader  eager  to  make  up  for  the  humiliation  that  had  occurred.  The  rise  of  a  figure  
like  Putin,  and  the  strategy  that  came  along  with  him,  went  directly  against  the  previous  leader’s  
tendencies,  and  can  be  understood  as  a  correction  of  earlier  mistakes  in  the  first  war.  The  trauma  
of  the  first  war  had  cemented  a  willingness  within  Russia  to  reassert  itself  as  a  country,  and  
within  Vladimir  Putin  to  assert  himself  as  a  leader  capable  of  molding  a  victorious  Russia.   
51  Ibid.,  p.  64  
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V. Domestic  Security  Implications  
As  discussed  in  the  first  part  of  this  thesis,  Russia  learned  four  significant  lessons  from  the  
conflict  in  Chechnya  which,  as  its  first  major  domestic  conflict  since  the  creation  of  the  Russian  
Federation,  had  notable  implications  on  Russian  domestic  policy  following  the  Chechen  Wars.  In  
this  section,  I  discuss  the  major  events  and  policies  which  can  be  viewed  through  various  lenses,  
including  one  of  continuation  of  the  lessons  learned  from  Chechnya.  I  will  address  two  domestic  
conflicts,  the  War  in  Ingushetia  (2007-2015)  and  the  Insurgency  in  the  North  Caucasus  
(2009-2017).  Since  the  two  domestic  conflicts  were  in  close  proximity  to  one  another,  and  
closely  related  to  the  conflict  in  Chechnya,  they  can  effectively  highlight  the  ways  in  which  
Russian  behavior  adapted,  either  in  accordance  with  the  methods  that  worked,  or  in  opposition  to  
previous  failures.  I  will  then  follow  with  an  analysis  of  major  Russian  domestic  policies  which  
can  be  linked  with  the  lessons  from  the  Chechen  encounters.  An  emphasis  will  be  placed  on  the  
policies  and  frameworks  adopted  as  a  result  of  Vladimir  Putin’s  plan  of  “Chechenization”,  the  
process  of  reforming  and  reconstructing  Chechnya  as  a  way  to  solve  the  Chechen  problem.  
Through  Chechenization,  Putin  and  Russia  reassert  dominance  over  the  once  unruly  republic  of  
Chechnya  and  force  it  to  align  more  closely  with  Russia’s  priorities.  
  
I  must  first  address  two  central  foreign  policy  theories  -  historical  continuity  and  the  imposed  
insecurity  theory.  Historical  continuity  theory,  in  Russian  foreign  policy,  hypothesizes  that  events  
in  Russian  history  have  seen  continuity  for  centuries,  and  that  Russia’s  perceived  “aggressive,  
expansionist,  and  imperialist  tendencies”  are  so  deeply  rooted  in  Russian  culture  that  the  course  
of  the  country  must  inherently  proceed  in  a  similar  fashion.  Imposed  insecurity  theory,  on  the  
other  hand,  rests  on  the  assumption  that  Russian  security  is  derived  from  the  insecurity  of  its  
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neighbors  and,  therefore,  requires  “near  constant  state  of  uncertainty  and  dependence”  by  states  
in  close  proximity  to  Russia  in  order  to  avoid  real  or  perceived  territorial  threats. 52   Historical  
continuity  theory  comes  into  conflict  with  the  central  claim  of  my  thesis,  which  is  that  the  
Chechen  Wars  had  a  profound  impact  on  Russian  security  strategy  in  its  formative  years  as  a  
nascent  country  and  are  visible  in  Russia’s  behavior  and  actions.  The  theory  would  argue  that  I  
am  overstating  the  importance  of  the  conflicts,  and  that  the  entire  course  of  Russian  history  has  
dictated  its  reaction.  
  
To  reconcile  this  schism,  I  must  disagree  with,  and  adjust,  the  claims  of  historical  continuity  
theory,  particularly  in  regard  to  the  importance  of  recency.  While  I  agree  that  Russia’s  past  plays  
a  role  in  shaping  its  present  and  future,  the  recency  effect,  a  psychological  term  generally  
attributed  to  people’s  emphasis  on  recent  events  due  to  better  memory,  would  argue  that  more  
recent  events  in  Russian  history  play  a  larger  role  in  shaping  its  actions.  Russia’s  vulnerable  
status  as  a  nascent  state,  coupled  with  the  relative  recency  of  the  Chechen  conflict,  gave  the  first  
and  second  wars  a  greater  role  in  the  Russian  psyche,  especially  given  the  dramatic  events  and  
conclusion.  Despite  the  second  having  ended  over  a  decade  ago,  the  context  in  which  they  
occurred  give  them  continued  relevance,  from  a  domestic  and  international  security  standpoint,  
in  the  eyes  of  Russian  Federation.  
  
War  in  Ingushetia   
Chechnya  has  served  as  an  important  symbol  in  Russian  security,  having  been  transformed  from  
“an  existential  threat  in  the  early  2000s”  to  a  case  of  successful  state-building  which  has  helped  
52  Tyler  Pack,  Chechnya,  Georgia,  and  Theories  of  Foreign  Policy ,  pp.  2,  5  
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shape  the  approach  to  other  domestic  and  foreign  security  threats. 53   The  War  in  Ingushetia,  in  
some  ways  an  extension  of  the  Chechen  conflict  given  Ingushetia’s  role,  has  hallmarks  of  both  
the  First  and  Second  Chechen  Wars.  In  the  case  of  the  War  in  Ingushetia,  Russia’s  2006  
counterterrorism  framework  outlined  the  successful  practices  that  had  been  used  in  Chechnya  
and  could  be  applied  elsewhere. 54   The  counter-insurgency  tactics  developed  by  Russia  to  fight  
back  and  ultimately  succeed  in  the  second  Chechen  conflict  were  carried  over  to  Ingushetia,  
where,  yet  again,  narratives  of  terrorist  influence  in  the  region  and  the  need  for  a  swift  response  
was  spread  to  garner  support  from  the  masses.  As  part  of  the  counterinsurgency,  Russia  actively  
censored  its  media  outlets  by  claiming  that  the  media  attention  played  to  the  terrorists’  
advantage,  and  therefore  needed  to  be  controlled. 55    
  
Censorship  and  control  of  the  media  is  by  no  means  a  new  practice;  its  effective  use  in  Chechnya  
directly  contributed  to  its  repeated  use  in  Ingushetia.  In  the  case  of  Chechnya,  terrorist  attacks  
perpetrated  against  Russia,  while  they  were  used  to  help  justify  Russia’s  incursion  into  
Chechnya,  also  threatened  Russia’s  ability  to  project  its  domestic  control.  Therefore,  Russia  put  
measures  in  place  allowing  it  the  authority  to  censor  the  media  in  situations  in  which  “national  
security”  was  at  stake.  Not  only  was  censorship  and  media  control  a  method  to  prevent  internal  
dissent,  but  it  was  also  a  mechanism  by  which  the  government  was  able  to  further  its  narrative  of  
defense  against  insurgent  terrorists.  Such  authoritative  measures,  first  put  in  place  for  almost  
identical  purposes  in  Chechnya,  were  repeated  in  Ingushetia,  one  of  the  first  post-Chechen  
conflicts.   
  
53  Aglaya  Snetkov,  Russia's  Security  Policy  under  Putin ,  pp.  2-3  
54  “‘As  If  They  Fell  From  the  Sky’:  Counterinsurgency,  Rights  Violations,  and  Rampant  Impunity  in  Ingushetia”  
55  Ibid.  
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The  “Islamic  renaissance”  that  emerged  in  neighboring  regions  is  often  attributed  directly  to  the  
Chechen  wars. 56   The  War  in  Ingushetia,  one  such  case,  constituted  the  first  opportunity  by  the  
seasoned  Russian  military  to  showcase  that  it  has  learned  from  its  previous  mistakes.  In  the  
previous  conflict,  the  Russian  military  had  seen  the  entire  region  of  Chechnya  as  a  security  
threat,  but  it  had  neglected  the  social  impact  of  its  actions  and,  unintentionally,  inflamed  the  
already  deeply-seeded  distrust  and  dissatisfaction  with  the  government.  A  similar  policy  to  that  
of  Chechenization,  which  was  put  in  place  to  help  reform  Chechnya  into  a  more  cooperative  
actor,  was  pushed  forth  in  Ingushetia.  Indeed,  towards  the  end  of  the  War  in  Ingushetia,  Moscow  
began  efforts  to  combat  unemployment,  expand  urban  areas,  and  improve  infrastructure. 57   
Identical  to  Chechnya,  in  which  Russia  came  to  the  realization  that  a  key  element  to  successful  
regional  policy  involves  winning  over  the  local  population,  Ingushetia  provides  an  example  in  
which  the  policies  aimed  at  rebuilding  favor  and  unity  in  Chechnya  were  replicated  in  a  later  
domestic  conflict.  
  
The  result  of  this  conflict  stands  in  direct  opposition  to  that  of  the  First  Chechen  War,  as  Russia  
was  not  hesitant  to  apply  heavy  pressure  and  military  force  against  Ingushetia  to  avoid  repeated  
humiliation.  Whereas  failure  to  act  quickly  and  uniformly  had  hampered  Russia’s  efforts  in  the  
First  Chechen  War,  Ingushetia  proved  to  be  a  case  of  quick  response.  The  humanitarian  situation  
was  horrific,  but  Russia’s  objectives  were  focused  on  the  existential  threat  posed  by  what  it  had  
deemed  to  be  an  increasingly  dangerous  religious  movement.  
  
56  Alekseĭ  Malashenko,  Dmitriĭ  Trenin,  and  Anatol  Lieven,  Russia's  Restless  Frontier:  The  Chechnya  Factor  in  
Post-Soviet  Russia ,  p.  79  
57  Francis  Naylor,  Geography  of  Asymmetrical  Conflict:Geographic  Perception  in  Post  Chechen  War  Ingushetia ,   
p.  48  
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As  the  years  have  passed,  Russia  has  acquired  a  reputation  for  swift  and  severe  action  when  it  
comes  to  domestic  conflicts.  Since  the  First  Chechen  War,  which  Russia  failed  to  act  quickly  
enough  to  quell  the  rebellion,  Russia  has  opted  for  a  “crush  it  early”  approach,  as  opposed  to  
seeking  peaceful  but  time-consuming  resolutions.  No  longer  willing  to  take  its  chances,  Russia  
has  shifted  its  domestic  policy  from  a  more  open-minded  vision  of  the  nineties  to  one  of  
merciless  authority.  While  not  necessarily  a  novel  idea  in  Russian  history,  the  significance  of  the  
shift  in  strategic  policy  for  the  Russian  Federation,  nonetheless,  requires  examination.  Before  the  
conflict,  Russia  had  shown  an  easing  in  its  pressure  on  opposition  and  dissent,  but  the  rebellion  
resulted  in  a  quick  reversal.  Any  discussions  about  whether  the  open-mindedness  would  have  
continued  given  other  circumstances  are  purely  speculative,  though  the  reactionary  nature  of  
Russia  in  Chechnya  may  aid  in  understanding  its  perception.   
  
Insurgency  in  North  Caucasus  
Immediately  following  the  Second  Chechen  War,  the  Insurgency  in  the  North  Caucasus  was  a  
low-level  conflict  fought  between  Russia  and  Islamist  militants  associated  with  the  Caucasus  
Emirate,  a  jihadist  organization  operating  out  of  parts  of  Syria  and  the  Caucasus  region.  The  
conflict  displayed  a  few  key  adaptations  made  on  the  part  of  Russia  following  Chechnya  and  
served  to  further  prove  the  fact  that  Russia’s  security  strategy  changed  in  large  part  due  to  the  
lessons  it  learned  from  the  Chechen  Wars.  In  the  case  of  the  insurgency,  more  structured,  
coherent  military  tactics  and  overall  strategy  were  applied,  as  opposed  to  the  lackluster  showing  




The  disorganization,  resulting  from  the  indiscriminate  deaths  of  many  civilians  in  the  Chechen  
Wars,  were  partially  due  to  the  unpreparedness  of  the  Russian  military,  though  this  lesson  was  
seen  to  have  been  corrected  in  response  to  the  insurgency.  Zachistkas ,  or  mop-up  operations,  
were  applied  towards  the  end  of  the  Second  Chechen  War  and  were  aimed  at  creating  a  more  
targeted  approach  to  finding  and  eliminating  insurgents  and  jihadists.   
  
However,  the  precision  of  these  operations  had  been  far  improved  by  the  Russians  in  response  to  
the  Insurgency  in  the  North  Caucasus.  In  between  the  First  and  Second  Chechen  Wars,  Russia  
developed  a  substantially  more  organized  approach  towards  its  targets  and  perceived  security  
threats. 58   In  addition  to  the  zachistkas ,  the  Russian  military,  by  the  time  of  the  insurgency,  had  
brought  in  specialized  elite  counterinsurgency  forces  to  lead  the  counterinsurgency  operation,  as  
opposed  to  Chechnya,  where  traditionally  trained  troops  were  utilized. 59   The  organizational  and  
structural  change  enabled  Russia  to  combat  insurgents  more  effectively  and  constituted  a  major  
shift  from  the  total  war  tactics  of  the  First  Chechen  War.   
  
While  the  two  military-style  changes  can  be  primarily  viewed  through  a  structural  lens,  they  can  
also  be  considered  attempts  by  Russia  to  encourage  unity  and  limit  division  within  the  region.  In  
Chechnya,  the  indiscriminate  killing  of  civilians  led  to  large  numbers  of  Chechens  becoming  
more  involved  in  the  cause  against  Russia  and  served  as  a  focal  point  for  Russian  understanding  
of  the  threat  of  radicalization  that  comes  from  targeting  its  own  citizens.  The  division  that  came  
from  Russia’s  indiscriminate  bombings  in  Chechnya  made  Russia  more  wary  of  the  implications,  
58  Emil  Souleimanov,  "The  North  Caucasus  Insurgency:  Dead  or  Alive?",  p.  49  
59  Ibid.,  p.  50  
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thereby  triggering  a  discernible  change  in  the  North  Caucasus  Insurgency,  in  which  the  
implementation  of  the  novel  tactics  had  led  to  a  decrease  in  insurgent  violence. 60   
The  concept  of  “Chechenization”  is  regarded  as  the  process  undertaken  by  the  Russian  
Federation  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Chechen  Wars  to  reform  (i.e.,  pacify)  the  republic  of  Chechnya  
into  an  unproblematic,  obedient  puppet  regime  that  could  be  controlled  from  Moscow.  What  is  
overlooked,  however,  is  the  Chechenization  that  occurred  outside  of  the  Chechen  republic,  and  
the  steps  taken  by  the  Russian  Federation,  with  Putin  at  the  forefront,  to  put  in  place  measures  
aimed  at  preventing  the  types  of  activity  that  led  directly  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Chechen  
conflicts.  Policies  and  actions  geared  towards  crackdowns  on  opposition,  justification  in  the  form  
of  carefully  crafted  narratives,  ensuring  unity  and  preventing  division,  and  guaranteeing  strong  
leadership  and  structured  policy  approaches  all  came  in  the  years  following  the  wars,  and  can  be  
attributed  heavily  to  the  lessons  learned  in  Chechnya.   
  
The  central  figures  in  the  process  of  Chechenization  are,  of  course,  Vladimir  Putin,  as  well  as  the  
former  and  current  leaders  of  Chechnya,  now-deceased  Akhmad  Kadyrov  and  his  son,  Ramzan  
Kadyrov.  Despite  once  being  part  of  the  separatist  movement  that  opposed  the  government,  the  
Kadyrovs  grew  closer  to  Putin  and  Moscow,  and  became  critical  to  helping  eliminate  the  sorts  of  
religiously-motivated  aggression  that  characterized  the  Second  Chechen  War.  The  prevention  of  
religious  dissent  within  Chechnya  has  contributed  directly  to  Putin’s  vision  of  a  more  united,  and  
more  secure,  Russian  Federation.  The  leadership  installed  in  Chechnya  and  other  republics  
following  the  war  was  one  of  the  mechanisms  aimed  at  preventing  religiously-fueled  dissent  
from  spreading  within  the  region  and  rising  to  the  pre-Chechen  War  levels.  Though  religious  
60  Ibid.  
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dissent  has  since  occurred  in  Ingushetia  and  elsewhere,  there  has  been  markedly  less,  and  the  
dissent  that  has  existed  has  not  posed  a  serious  existential  threat  to  the  Federation.   
  
While  leadership  and  military  interference  were  pivotal  in  the  control  of  religious  opposition  
within  Chechnya,  the  wars  also  sparked  broader  political  opposition  from  outside  of  the  
Caucasus  that  was  addressed  primarily  through  control  over  the  media.  Since  the  wars,  other  
methods  at  inhibiting  domestic  dissent  have  been  introduced;  these  include  heavier  control  of  the  
media,  discouraging  and  delegitimizing  protests,  harassment  of  opposition  leaders,  and  increased  
control  of  the  internet. 61   While  such  factors,  when  considered  independently,  do  not  trace  back  to  
any  one  event  and,  to  some  extent,  represent  a  broader  Russian  policy  grounded  in  historical  
continuity  theory,  the  broader  image  of  such  crackdowns  on  opposition  are  evidently  linked  with  
Chechnya.  The  successful  tactics  used  to  censor  the  media’s  coverage  of  events  deemed 
threatening  to  national  security  at  the  time  of  the  Chechen  conflicts  have  become  hallmarks  of  
the  Russian  Federation.  
  
Putin’s  relationship  with  the  media  has  also  been  shaped  by  Russia’s,  and  his,  experiences  in  
Chechnya.  As  previously  mentioned,  the  press  enjoyed  relative  freedom  during  the  first  war,  but  
the  eventual  crackdown  by  the  government  in  the  later  years,  and  Russia’s  subsequent  victory,  
helped  solidify  the  association  between  open  media  coverage  and  chaotic  regional  politics. 62   In  
the  interview  with  Dr.  Fiona  Hill,  she  emphasized  the  inherent  link  between  Russia’s  territorial  
integrity  and  its  perception  of  domestic  security. 63   Until  the  Second  Chechen  War,  the  media  had  
been  perceived  as  acting  against  the  will  of  the  government  and,  consequently,  in  encouragement  
61  Maria  Lipman,  "How  Putin  Silences  Dissent:  Inside  the  Kremlin's  Crackdown”  
62  Uwe  Halback,  Chechnya’s  Status  within  the  Russian  Federation ,  p.  31  
63  Fiona  Hill.  Personal  interview.  12  March  2021.  
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of  the  Chechen  rebellion  that  directly  threatened  Russia’s  territorial  integrity.  The  perception  of  
the  press  as  a  threat  by  the  top  members  of  the  Russian  government  was,  therefore,  in  direct  
opposition  to  Russia’s  domestic  security,  and  required  a  correction.  Since  the  second  war,  Russia  
has  continued  to  showcase  its  control  over  the  media  through  various  laws,  such  as  one  enacted  
in  2014  that  prohibits  “calls  to  harm  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Russian  Federation”. 64   From  a  
policy  perspective,  Chechnya  has  made  Russia  hyper-aware  of  its  territorial  vulnerabilities  and  
has  acted  as  a  catalyst  for  the  manipulation  of  policies  to  further  an  authoritarian  agenda.  
  
Western  reaction  has  been  largely  centered  around  the  argument  that  Russia’s  assertions  of  
control  over  the  media  represent  a  larger  attempt  by  the  regime  to  inhibit  democracy  and  place  
limitations  on  human  rights.  This  narrative,  while  partially  accurate,  fails  to  consider  the  
reasoning  behind  such  actions.  As  seen  in  the  First  Chechen  War,  the  freedom  of  the  press  has  
been  perceived  as  a  threat  to  domestic  stability,  rather  than  a  proponent  of  it.  Yes,  maintaining  a  
grip  over  the  media  has  afforded  Putin  consistently  high  popularity  among  his  constituents  and  
therefore  allowed  him  to  maintain  his  position  of  power.   
  
However,  reducing  Russia’s  control  over  the  media  to  simply  a  power  grab  inadequately  
represents  the  real  threat  perceived  by  Russia  during  the  First  Chechen  War.  The  alternative,  
which  has  rightfully  been  criticized  by  human  rights  organizations, 65   should  be  reexamined  
through  the  lens  of  the  “Chechen  problem”  which  suggests  that,  through  increased  censorship  of  
media  outlets,  Russia  has  been  able  to  reassert  control  over  its  own  territory  and  achieve  a  higher  
level  of  overall  domestic  security.  
64  Uwe  Halback,  Chechnya’s  Status  within  the  Russian  Federation ,  p.  10  




Similarly  to  the  2014  law,  Chechnya  has  also  become  a  pretext  for  various  other  authoritarian  
measures  that  have  resulted  in  increased  corruption,  attempts  at  extraterritorial  justice,  and  
espionage  activities. 66   The  traumatic  nature  of  Russia’s  initial  experience  with  Chechnya,  
including  the  loss  of  the  first  war,  have  driven  it  to  commit  violent  acts  against  Russian  
opposition  leaders  and  other  national  governments.  According  to  Maura  Reynolds’s  
on-the-ground  reporting  of  the  First  Chechen  War,  Russia’s  response  to  Chechnya  is  largely  
emotional, 67   as  it  challenges  the  unity  of  Russian  national  identity  and  affirms  Wilhelmsen’s  
argument  that  Chechnya  posed  an  existential  threat  to  the  notion  of  the  “Russian  self.”   
  
Though  cracking  down  on  opposition  was  an  effective  way  for  Putin  to  prevent  security  threats  
from  gaining  momentum,  the  ability  to  establish  unity  between  Chechnya  and  Russia  in  the  
aftermath  of  the  wars  was  part  of  the  effort  to  prevent  security  threats  from  initially  gaining  
traction.  The  most  likely  culprit  for  the  establishment  of  a  new  Chechen-Russian  relationship  
was  the  Kadyrov  family,  which  enabled  Putin  to  forge  a  relationship  of  trust  and  loyalty,  as  
opposed  to  the  Dudayev-Yeltsin  relationship  that  ended  poorly.  In  a  famous  November  1991  
decree,  General  Dudayev  called  on  “all  Moscow-based  Muslims  to  turn  the  city  into  a   
“disaster  area”. 68   To  contrast,  Chechnya’s  first  president  following  the  second  war,  Kadyrov  has  
helped  construct  a  Chechnya  that  “portrays  itself  as  an  advocate  for  Russian  multiethnic  unity.” 69   
Kadyrov’s  importance  cannot  be  overstated,  since  he  has  successfully  fulfilled  his  role  within  
Russia’s  security  framework  as  a  pacifier  for  the  republic. 70   His  rise  has  become  quintessential  
66  Fiona  Hill.  Personal  interview.  12  March  2021.  
67  Maura  Reynolds ,  Personal  interview,  19  March  2021.  
68  Trenin,  Malashenko,  and  Lieven,  “ Russia's  Restless  Frontier ”,  p.  18  
69  Uwe  Halback,  Chechnya’s  Status  within  the  Russian  Federation ,  p.  6  
70  Maura  Reynolds ,  Personal  interview,  19  March  2021.  
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for  Russia  and  Putin’s  fulfillment  of  Chechenization,  as  Kadyrov’s  tactics  of  warlordism  play  
directly  into  Russia’s  desire  to  regulate  Chechnya,  despite  the  violence  and  record  of  human  
rights  abuses.   
  
Post-Chechen  Wars,  Russia  went  about  centralizing  its  political  structures  in  an  attempt  to  
establish  overarching  control  over  its  territory.  Putin’s  inheritance  of  the  Russian  presidency  in  
May  2000,  right  around  the  beginning  of  the  Second  Chechen  War,  came  along  with  some  
dramatic  changes  aimed  at  avenging  the  loss  of  the  first  war  and  restructuring  the  Russian  
political  system  in  a  way  that  would  provide  for  stabilization  through  centralization.  In  essence:  
“The  domestic  institutional  and  bureaucratic  context  of  Putin’s  first  term  as  president  
was,  therefore,  fraught  with  elements  of  continuity  from  the  Yeltsin  period,  but  also  
radical  signs  of  change.  [In  his  2008  book  “Putin’s  leadership:  Character  and  
consequences”,  Richard  Sakwa]  characterises  this  initial  period  of  the  Putin  leadership  
as  a  turn  towards  needed  centralisation  and  stabilisation,  aimed  at  restoring  the  
‘grandeur  of  office’”.  71   
Putin’s  rise  in  2000  was  a  response  to  Russian  structural  disorganization  of  the  mid  and  late  
nineties.  His  remaining  in  power  is  a  signal  of  the  regime’s  (and  to  some  extent,  the  people’s)  
satisfaction  with  the  stability  and  relative  peace  that  has  resulted  and  endured.  At  its  core,  
Chechnya  exemplified  the  weaknesses  of  Russia's  conflicting  political  hierarchy  and  
organizational  structure.  As  a  response,  Russian  leadership  initially  fought  back  to  address  
previous  errors  and  has  since  remained  steadfast  along  the  path  that  had  been  set  in  the  second  
war.   
  
71  Licínia  Simão,  “Do  Leaders  Still  Decide?  The  Role  of  Leadership  in  Russian  Foreign  Policymaking”,  p.  489  
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Compared  to  what  it  was  in  the  early  nineties,  contemporary  Russia  has  become  a  shadow  of  
itself.  As  of  2017,  Russia  has  continued  along  the  path  of  centralization,  with  some  Russian  
experts  referring  to  the  process  as  “hyper-centralization”.  Russia’s  fixation  with  maintaining  its  
territorial  integrity  is  associated  in  its  psyche  to  its  previous  lack  of  structure,  which  has  directly  
led  to  its  continuation  on  a  pathway  that  emphasizes  clear  political  structures  and  leadership  
roles. 72    
The  domestic  implications  of  the  Chechen  Problem,  as  it  has  been  referred  to,  has  forced  Russia  
to  examine  the  effectiveness  of  its  policies  regarding  social  freedoms  and  resort  to  old  historical  
methods  of  authoritarianism  and  state-control.   
72  Uwe  Halback,  Chechnya’s  Status  within  the  Russian  Federation ,  p.  12  
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VI. International  Security  Implications  
Though  Russia's  domestic  policy  and  conflicts  have  showcased  the  lessons  learned  from  the  
Chechen  conflicts,  it  is  also  important  to  examine  the  ways  in  which  Russian  foreign  policy  and  
conflict  have  done  the  same.  For  Chechnya’s  impact  to  hold  true  in  the  way  that  I  argue,  it  must  
be  shown  that  Russia's  foreign  security  strategy  and  perspective  have  also  been  impacted  by  the  
conflict.  For  these  reasons,  I  discuss  the  impact  of  the  conflict  on  Russian  foreign  policy  and  
external  conflict  in  the  following  pages.   
  
By  incorporating  elements  of  international  relations  theory  and  expert  opinions,  I  strive  to  show  
that,  foreign  affairs  shifted  because  of  the  first  and  second  Chechen  Wars,  as  did  domestic  affairs.  
In  particular,  I  address  the  most  notable  foreign  conflicts,  particularly  the  conflict  between  
Russia  and  Ukraine  in  the  Crimea  (2014)  and  the  Syrian  Civil  War  (2015).  Additionally,  I  
analyze  the  broader  trends  in  Russian  foreign  policy  and  security  strategy  shifts  along  with  the  
extent  to  which  they  have  been  shaped  by  the  Chechen  War.   
  
Syria  
The  Chechen  Wars,  in  many  ways,  represent  an  entirely  different  security  threat  than  does  
Russia's  presence  in  Syria.  Some  may  wonder  how  it  is  possible  for  a  previous  domestic  conflict  
to  impact  so  heavily  an  international  one,  though  the  trends  that  began  because  of  the  Chechen  
conflicts,  particularly  the  success  of  the  counterterrorism  justification  campaign,  may  provide  
some  insight.  For  example,  the  religious  divisions  that  were  sparked  during  the  Chechen  Wars  
have  become  a  recurring  theme  during  the  Syrian  Civil  War,  which  began  in  2014,  in  which  the  
fears  of  division  and  potential  spillover  into  Russian  territory  were  important  factors  in  keeping  
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Russia  engaged. 73   The  Islamization  of  the  Chechen  conflict  has,  for  better  or  worse,  become  an  
integral  part  in  defining  the  Russian  relationship  with  Chechnya,  and,  as  a  result,  have  pulled  
Russia  deeper  into  conflicts  with  religious  undertones  out  of  concern  for  their  spread  to  Russia.   
  
In  the  case  of  Syria,  other  economic,  political,  and  social  factors  drove  Russia  to  become  
involved,  though  it  is  clear  by  Russia’s  portrayal  of  the  conflict  as  a  security  threat  to  the  Russian  
populace  that  old  wounds  were  at  stake  as  well.  The  recency  of  the  Chechen  wars  and  Russia’s  
need  to  deal  with  religious  differences  domestically  made  the  conflict  even  more  relevant  for  this  
study,  as  it  provided  an  opportunity  for  Russia  to  act  on  its  knowledge  of  the  dangers  of  division  
and  involve  itself  as  a  preemptive  measure.   
  
In  addition  to  fears  that  the  Syrian  conflict  could  reawaken  past  divisions  and  oppose  the  
domestic  policies  aimed  at  stabilizing  various  groups  in  Russia,  it  also  provided  Russia  the  
opportunity  to  implement  the  series  of  justification  responses  that  enabled  it  to  succeed  in  its  
second  campaign  against  the  Chechens.  The  involvement  of  Russia  in  the  Syrian  conflict  gave  
Russia  the  opportunity  to  project  an  “overarching  frame  of  reference  (counterterrorism)  onto  the  
entire  conflict”. 74   The  ability  of  Russia  to  project  its  counterterrorist  narrative  has  been  boosted  
by  transfer  of  fighters  from  the  North  Caucasus  region  to  Syria  to  support  the  jihadist  cause  
against  the  Assad  regime. 75   As  the  Chechen  conflict  had  taught  Russia  that  justifying  action  can  
have  extraordinary  importance  in  garnering  and  maintaining  support  among  the  Russian  
population,  the  same  was  seen  during  the  Syrian  conflict.  The  moralistic  overtones  of  the  official  
Russian  narrative  surrounding  the  Syrian  conflict  served  to  justify  Russia’s  decision  to  intervene  
73  Hanna  Notte,  "Russia  in  Chechnya  and  Syria:  Pursuit  of  Strategic  Goals",  pp.  59-60  
74  Ibid.,  p.  62  
75  Emil  Souleimanov,  "The  North  Caucasus  Insurgency:  Dead  or  Alive?",  p.  74  
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in  the  Middle  East  to  its  citizenry  and  has  allowed  it  to  maintain  a  persona  as  a  leading  nation  in  
the  war  on  terror  and  the  stand  against  groups  like  the  Islamic  State.   
  
To  summarize,  Russia’s  involvement  in  Syria  can  be  viewed  through  a  Chechen  lens  in  which  
Russia’s  primary  objectives  in  the  region  are  to  prevent  the  religious  radicalism  and  division  that  
characterized  parts  of  the  Chechen  insurgency  from  being  reinvigorated  by  religious  infighting  
and  general  instability  in  a  neighboring  region.  To  do  so,  Russia  has  actively  participated  in  the  
propping  up  of  the  Assad  regime,  as  well  as  reemphasizing  and  expanding  the  counterterrorism  
campaign  from  domestic  to  global  interference.  Russian  strategic  perspectives  have  shifted  from  
domestic-focused  to  more  global,  especially  as  the  counterterrorism  campaign  has  been  
increasingly  presented  as  an  international  operation  as  of  July  2000,  where  Putin  officially  
shifted  in  his  presentation  of  the  Chechen  conflict  as  a  threat  that  extended  beyond  borders. 76   
  
Ukraine  
Russia’s  invasion  of  Crimea  in  2014  was  interpreted  as  historic  in  some  regards,  whereas  it  could  
also  be  viewed  as  a  less  surprising  step  in  the  context  of  post-Chechen  War  Russia  and  Putin.  
Chechnya  revealed  to  both  Russia  and  Putin  the  volatility  of  its  territorial  security  and  made  
them  both  hyper-aware  of  potential  triggers  that  could  lead  to  chaos.  As  a  result,  Putin  has  helped  
form  a  Russia  willing  and  able  to  strike  at  any  threats  to  Russian  security,  whether  real  or  
perceived.  In  the  case  of  Ukraine,  the  rapidly  evolving  political  situation  that  followed  the  
Maidan  revolution  ended  in  a  country  ready  to  draw  closer  relations  to  Europe  and  the  European  
Union  (EU). 77   This  trigger  can  be  connected  to  previous  events  in  Ukraine,  such  as  that  of  the  
76  Hanna  Notte,  "Russia  in  Chechnya  and  Syria:  Pursuit  of  Strategic  Goals",  p.  60  
77  Aglaya  Snetkov,  Russia's  Security  Policy  under  Putin ,  p.  75  
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Orange  Revolution  (2004-2005),  in  which  Ukraine’s  internal  unrest  awakened  old  fears  within  
Russia  of  its  own  susceptibility  to  instability.  Russia’s  perception  of  the  threat  posed  by  the  
European  Union  as  an  actor  with  interests  in  direct  opposition  to  those  of  the  Russian  Federation  
pushed  it  to  its  breaking  point.   
  
Russia’s  justification  of  Crimean  annexation  represents  another  pattern  in  post-Chechnya  
Russian  security  strategy,  since  its  use  in  the  Chechen  Wars  helped  shape  the  narrative  needed  to  
win  over  Russian  support  for  the  action,  thereby  increasing  Russia’s  perceived  level  of  security.  
Just  as  Chechnya  was  presented  and  perceived  by  the  Russian  population,  so  too  was  Ukraine.  
The  annexation  was  met  with  massive  civilian  support,  helping  shift  Putin’s  popularity  and  
adding  to  his  and  Russia’s  perceived  security  position. 78   Chechnya  was  framed  as  a  
counterterrorist  threat  in  the  same  way  that  Ukraine  was  presented  as  a  threat  to  Russian  
nationalism,  therefore  sparking  a  similar  reaction  among  the  Russian  people.   
  
The  justification  process  that  had  been  so  successful  in  Chechnya  had  paid  off  again,  though  the  
case  of  Ukraine  seems  to  be  a  case  of  a  perceived  threat  more  so  than  a  real  one,  since  little  
evidence  exists  to  justify  Russia’s  claims  that  an  overwhelming  majority  of  Crimeans  favored  
joining  the  Federation. 79   Despite  this,  Putin’s  mischaracterization  of  sentiment  in  Crimea  to  the  
Russian  people  also  helped  drive  Russian  nationalism,  another  key  lesson  taken  from  the  
Chechen  conflicts.   
  
78  Steven  Pifer,  “Crimea:  Six  Years  after  Illegal  Annexation”  
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The  approach  towards  Ukraine  has  also  mirrored  the  approach  of  the  Russian  military  after  they 
had  adapted  to  the  conditions  of  fighting  in  Chechnya.  Whereas  it  took  some  time  to  realize  that  
specialized  forces  were  needed  to  combat  the  guerilla  warfare  occurring  in  Chechnya,  Russia  
responded  to  the  Ukrainian  crisis  in  Crimea  with  deployments  of  elite  units  without  hesitation. 80   
This  adaptive  military  approach  marks  a  change  in  traditional  Russian  military  response  in  favor  
of  a  hybrid-warfare,  elite  forces  model.  The  original  course  of  action  used  in  Chechnya  was  not  
the  organized  strategy  needed,  but  the  mistake  was  not  repeated  in  Crimea.  The  application  of  a  
more  organized  strategy  in  Ukraine  marks  an  application  of  the  initial  failed  attempt  in  Chechnya  
that  was  later  corrected  in  the  second  war.   
  
Chechnya,  in  this  light,  should  be  thought  of  as  the  first  domino  to  fall,  since  it  is  sealed  in  the  
memory  of  Russia  as  the  first  security  dilemma,  and  an  extremely  costly  one.  It  is  interesting,  
however,  to  note  the  opposing  approaches  by  Russia  towards  self-determination  in  Ukraine  and  
Chechnya.  Whereas  the  Chechens’  self-determination  within  Russia  added  to  the  perceived  
security  threat,  that  of  ethnic  Russians  in  Ukraine  was  harnessed  by  the  Russian  Federation  in  its  
justification  of  Crimea’s  annexation.  The  perception  of  self-determination  does  not  diminish  the  
influence  of  Chechnya  on  future  security  issues  like  Ukraine.  If  anything,  it  strengthens  the  
argument,  as  this  seemingly  contradictory  point  serves  to  showcase  Russia’s  capacity  to  
manipulate  events  in  a  way  that  serves  its  own  agenda.   
  
Unlike  the  Yeltsin  era,  which  ended  soon  after  the  start  of  the  Second  Chechen  War,  Putin’s  rise  
to  power  is  often  referred  to  as  a  “return  to  a  centralised  system  of  decisions”  referred  to  as  
80  Emil  Souleimanov,  "The  North  Caucasus  Insurgency:  Dead  or  Alive?",  p.  59  
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“power  vertikal”. 81   In  essence,  the  transition  of  power  from  Yeltsin  to  Putin  marked  a  shift  in  
Russia’s  approach  to  foreign  policy  by  reassociating  the  position  of  the  Russian  president  with  
shaping  foreign  policy  objectives.  It  is  important  to  mention  that,  prior  to  Yeltsin,  a  highly  
centralized  form  of  policymaking  defined  the  Soviet  system,  so  as  not  to  suggest  that  the  
Chechen  conflict  somehow  marked  an  entirely  new  role  of  the  Russian  presidency.  The  Chechen  
Wars  have,  however,  marked  the  beginning  of  a  different  leader  and  style  of  leadership  for  the  
Russian  Federation  that  has  since  persisted.  Unlike  Yeltsin,  Putin  has  become  synonymous  with  
centralization  and  has  set  a  clear  foreign  policy  direction  for  Russia. 82   Putin’s  rapid  rise  to  power  
can  be  seen  as  a  rebuke  of  the  previous  regime’s  handling  of  the  First  Chechen  War,  while  his  
successful  performance  in  the  second  war  helped  him  maintain  positive  approval  of  the  Russian  
people  and  solidify  power.  The  failure  of  the  Yeltsin  regime  to  establish  a  central  strategy  for  the  
Chechen  conflict  put  Russia  in  an  unfamiliar  position  of  weakness  that  Putin  was  certain  not  to  
replicate.  The  centralized  structure  of  the  Putin  regime  has  become  a  staple  of  Russia’s  current  
security  strategy,  which  associates  a  centralized  system  with  a  secure  Russia.   
  
The  genius  of  Vladimir  Putin  is,  at  its  core,  a  correction  of  Yeltsin’s  mistakes.  The  threat  of  
Chechnya  came  from  its  direct  opposition  to  the  idea  of  a  greater  Russian  nation  and  replacement  
with  an  ethnic  and  religious  nationalism  that  struck  at  the  heart  of  a  country  that  had  previously  
been  united  under  a  common  ideology.  After  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union,  Russia  had  not  yet  
found  its  unifying  force  and  had  begun  exposing  cracks  that  Chechnya  ultimately  took  advantage  
of.  One  of  the  greatest  impacts  of  the  Chechen  conflict  is  the  rise  and  development  of  Putin  and  
his  leadership  style,  which,  though  distinct  from  the  old  Soviet  style  in  many  ways,  has  traces  of  
81  Licínia  Simão,  “Do  Leaders  Still  Decide?  The  Role  of  Leadership  in  Russian  Foreign  Policymaking”,  p.  483  
82  Ibid.,  p.  492  
43  
  
the  USSR’s  unification  strategy  which  cast  a  wide  ideological  net,  which  ultimately  enabled  a  
system  of  government  to  carry  on  for  nearly  seven  decades.  Putin,  as  opposed  to  Yeltsin,  was  
able  to  reinvigorate  Russia’s  sense  of  common  identity  through  strong  appeals  to  nationalism  that  
were  independent  of  ethnicity,  race,  religion,  or  other  divisive  elements.  The  divisive  nature  of  
the  Chechen  movement  that  threatened  Russia  internally  led  Putin  to  adopt  a  new  kind  of  
Russian  nationalism  that  could  serve  as  a  symbol  of  Russian  unity,  thereby  discouraging  both  
domestic  and  international  efforts  to  come  between  Russians  and  Russia.  In  this  light,  the  rise  of  
Putin  as  a  unification  symbol,  in  the  context  of  a  divided  Russia  in  2000,  has  led  Russia  and  
Putin  scholars  like  Fiona  Hill  to  characterize  Putin  as  the  ultimate  Russian  statesman,  or  
государственник  (“Gosudarstvenik”). 83    
83  Clifford  Gaddy  and  Fiona  Hill,  “Vladimir  Putin  as  Statist:  Restoring  the  Greatness  of  Russia”  
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VII. Pathways  Forward  
Chechnya  has  played  a  significant  role  in  shaping  Russia’s  security  perspective,  beginning  with  
the  outbreak  of  the  First  Chechen  War  and  continuing  to  this  day.  Through  Russia’s  action  and  
reaction  to  the  War  in  Ingushetia,  the  Insurgency  in  the  North  Caucasus,  and  its  general  policy  
implementation  since  Chechnya,  Russia  has  shown  that  it  has  taken  and  applied  various  lessons  
domestically.  Russia’s  active  participation  in  Syria  and  Ukraine  has  shown  its  willingness  to  take  
the  lessons  from  the  Chechen  conflicts  and  applied  them  in  its  global  affairs.   
  
From  Russia’s  security  perspective,  Chechnya  changed  everything:  the  volatility  of  Russia’s  
borders,  the  malleability  of  the  Russian  national  identity,  and  the  weaknesses  left  over  from  the  
Soviet  era,  all  became  exposed.  Most  notably,  Chechnya  uncovered  the  truest  point  of  sensitivity  
in  Russian  perceptions  of  security:  territory.  While  Russian  threat  perception  remains  complex  
and  multidimensional,  much  of  the  lessons  learned  from  Chechnya  connect  back  to  Russia’s  fear  
of  compromising  its  territorial  integrity,  and  its  responses  to  the  lessons  from  the  conflicts  mark  
an  attempt  by  Russia  to  restore  confidence  in  its  borders.   
  
Since  the  Cold  War,  the  United  States  has  looked  for  ways  to  ease  the  relationship  with  the  then  
Soviet  Union  and  now  Russian  Federation,  arguably  to  no  avail.  It  appears,  in  both  Russian  and  
American  media,  the  two  states  have  been  pitted  against  each  other  in  an  endless  battle,  with  no  
winner  in  sight.  From  both  a  Russian  and  Western  perspective,  attempts  to  restore  the  attitudes  of  
optimism  for  a  fresh  start  after  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  began  to  slowly  fade,  while  
Chechnya  served  to  hasten  the  process.  Improvement  of  West-Russia  relations  have  since  
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become  an  elusive  concept,  though  it  is  worth  reexamining  the  potential  of  improved  relations  
through  the  newfound  understanding  of  Russia  as  a  result  of  the  Chechen  case  study.   
  
The  recommendations  below  are  based  upon  both  the  understanding  of  Russia  through  the  lens  
of  Chechnya  impact,  as  well  as  the  expert  opinions  of  subject-matter  experts  like  Dr.  Fiona  Hill  
and  Maura  Reynolds,  among  others.  While  the  strain  of  the  West-Russia  relationship  will  require  
years,  or  even  decades,  to  repair,  the  implementation  of  the  following  recommendations  would  
set  the  two  sides  on  a  positive  course  that  has  so  far  evaded  both.  
  
Cultivate  understanding  of  Russia  
According  to  experts  like  Fiona  Hill,  the  Chechen  conflict  imparted  Russia  with  a  tolerance  for  
messiness  in  both  domestic  and  global  affairs. 84   Since  then,  Russia  has  had  an  increased  
tolerance  for  violence,  espionage,  and  chaotic  operations  in  its  handling  of  conflicts.  As  a  result,  
Russia  has  become  accustomed  to  dealing  with  matters  unilaterally,  opting  for  an  approach  in  
which  it  can  exert  maximum  control.  As  a  result  of  its  disregard  for  professional  approaches,  
which  emphasize  diplomatic  negotiation  and  condemn  unilateral  acts  of  aggression,  Russia  has  
alienated  itself  from  the  West.  On  the  other  hand,  the  West  has  failed  to  understand  Russia’s  
reasoning  behind  its  often  hostile  activities  internal  and  external  to  its  spheres  of  influence.   
  
In  an  open  letter  to  US  policymakers,  103  foreign-policy  experts  outlined  the  dangerous  
trajectory  of  the  US-Russia  relationship  given  the  continued  strain  and  exchanged  hostilities  
between  the  two  entities. 85   Countries  of  the  Western  Hemisphere,  led  by  the  United  States,  have  
84  Fiona  Hill.  Personal  interview.  12  March  2021.  
85  Rose  Gottemoeller,  Thomas  Graham,  Fiona  Hill,  Jon  Huntsman,  Jr.,  Robert  Legvold,  and  Thomas  R.  Pickering,  
"Opinion:  It's  Time  to  Rethink  Our  Russia  Policy",  POLITICO  
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fundamentally  misunderstood  the  Russian  perspective.  Instead,  they  have  adopted  the  belief  that  
Russia  is  set  on  destroying  Western  society  and  asserting  global  domination.  This  
mischaracterization  ignores  important  components  of  the  Russian  experience,  like  the  Chechen  
conflicts,  which  have  made  it  wary  of  its  global  power  position  and  sensitive  to  the  subject  of  
Western  influence.  The  first  step  in  improving  West-Russia  relations  must  come  from  an  
improved  understanding  of  the  experiences  of  each  actor  and  the  ways  in  which  the  respective  
experiences  of  each  have  impacted  their  respective  perceptions  and  outlooks.  
  
From  the  standpoint  of  the  Chechen  conflicts  and  their  impact  on  Russia,  the  West’s  
comprehension  of  Russia’s  reasoning  behind  its  response  to  the  conflict,  and  how  those  
responses  have  shaped  future  responses,  must  be  deepened.  As  an  example,  Western  perspective  
may  focus  on  the  Chechen  rebellion  as  an  instance  of  Russian  aggression  and  suppression  against  
one  of  its  ethnic  populations  for  the  purpose  of  consolidating  power  to  use  internationally.  From  
the  perspective  of  Russian  leadership,  however,  Chechnya  constituted  an  uprising  that,  if  not  
properly  quelled,  could  threaten  the  territorial  integrity  and  national  identity  of  the  whole  
Russian  Federation.  Inevitably,  Russia’s  conflict  with  Chechnya  included  an  element  of  power  
politics.  However,  the  difference  in  perception  of  Chechnya’s  importance  to  both  the  West  and  
Russia  have  contributed  to  a  wider  misunderstanding  of  the  intentions  and  priorities  of  each.   
  
Continued  or  increased  funding  to  think  tanks,  federally  funded  research  and  development  
centers  (FFRDC),  and  academic  institutions  undertaking  research  on  foreign  affairs  and  Russia  
will  help  facilitate  a  less  superficial  understanding  of  Russia,  while  helping  dismantle  old  
perceptions  blurred  by  outdated  Cold  War  rhetoric.  Additionally,  increased  involvement  of,  and  
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reliance  on,  regional  and  foreign  policy  experts  in  high-level  negotiations  or  in  the  policymaking  
process  will  ensure  that  attitudes  towards  Russia  do  not  reflect  biased  or  partisan  attitudes.  
Maura  Reynolds’s  on-the-ground  reporting  in  Chechnya  helped  inject  understanding  of  an  
otherwise  distant  conflict  into  the  American  conversation  about  Russian  foreign  policy. 86   Fiona  
Hill’s  time  as  a  student  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  as  a  senior  advisor  engaging  with  high-level  
Russian  officials  have  contributed  to  her  current  depth  of  understanding  of  the  Russian  
perspective,  making  her  an  invaluable  asset  for  building  Western  competency  in  approaching  
Russia. 87   Without  the  efforts  of  such  individuals,  the  West-Russia,  or  US-Russia,  relationship  
would  lack  the  first-hand  experience  necessary  to  markedly  improve  it.  Prioritization  of  expertise  
in  talks  and  policymaking,  and  encouragement  of  research  and  travel  will  be  instrumental  in  
reinvigorating  the  West-Russia  relationship.  
  
Practice  Strategic  Empathy  
As  Fiona  Hill  states,  “strategic  empathy”  is  a  unique  quality,  grounded  in  education  and  
awareness,  that  allows  for  one  state  to  better  approach  issues  related  to  the  latter  by  
acknowledging  and  understanding  the  perspectives  of  the  latter  state. 88   The  trauma  and  
humiliation  associated  with  the  First  Chechen  War  instilled  strategic  empathy  in  Russia, 89   while  
simultaneously  implanting  Russia  with  a  feeling  of  vengeance  towards  Chechnya  and  a  distrust  
of  the  outside  world.  Strategic  empathy  allowed  Russia  to  acknowledge  and  develop  close  
relations  with  countries  that  had  dealt  with  terrorism,  as  the  Chechen  Wars  gave  Russia  a  novel  
experience  with  jihadist  activities  within  its  borders.  For  example,  in  the  aftermath  of  Chechnya,  
86  Maura  Reynolds ,  Personal  interview,  19  March  2021.  
87  Fiona  Hill.  Personal  interview.  12  March  2021.  
88  Ibid.  
89  Ibid.  
    Maura  Reynolds .  Personal  interview.  19  March  2021.  
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Russia  showed  a  willingness  to  join  forces  with  the  West  to  tackle  global  terrorism,  evident  in  the  
campaign  for  the  War  on  Terror  that  followed  the  events  of  9/11. 90   Strategic  empathy,  though  not  
guaranteed,  has  the  potential  to  bring  together  adversarial  nations  in  a  way  that  allows  for  the  
pursuit  of  shared  strategic  goals  and  for  de-escalation  of  hostilities  between  state  actors.   
  
Practicing  strategic  empathy  allows  for  the  identification  and  pursuit  of  common  objectives.  The  
Chechen  conflicts  provided  Russia  with  an  awareness  of  terrorism’s  threat,  though  other  events  
have  given  it  a  strong  interest  in  arms  control  and  the  environment  related  issues.  Unfortunately,  
cooperative  efforts  such  as  the  Intermediate-Range  Nuclear  Forces  (INF)  Treaty  have  grinded  to  
a  halt.  The  current  breakdown  of  formerly  successful  efforts,  however,  is  not  a  comment  on  the  
effectiveness  of  strategic  empathy.  Rather,  the  breakdown  suggests  that  previously  shared  
priorities  that  allowed  for  cooperation  have  fundamentally  shifted,  and  that  strategic  empathy  
was  likely  not  a  component  holding  the  effort  together.  Strategic  empathy,  therefore,  can  provide  
a  more  long-term  solution  for  the  improvement  of  West-Russia  relations,  since  its  effectiveness  
does  not  depend  on  the  existence  of  shared  priorities.   
  
Sufficient  expertise  and  understanding  on  the  part  of  national  leadership  are  required  to  put  
strategic  empathy  to  practice,  which  adds  a  level  of  importance  to  the  previously  emphasized  
cultivation  of  understanding  between  the  West  and  Russia.  The  importance  of  perception  must  
also  remain  preeminent  because  strategic  empathy  requires  an  understanding  of  not  only  the  
realities  faced  by  a  state,  but  its  perceptions.  The  significance  of  the  Chechen  Wars  stems  not  
from  the  results  of  the  conflict,  but  the  impact  on  the  Russian  security  perspective.  Russia’s  
perspective  of  Chechnya  forced  it  to  reconsider  its  sense  of  security.  It  became  hyper-aware  of  
90  Alexander  Vershbow  and  Daniel  Fried,  "How  the  West  Should  Deal  with  Russia",  Atlantic  Council  
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domestic  and  international  events  near  its  territory  or  spheres  of  influence,  and  more  willing  to  
respond  quickly  as  a  defense  mechanism.  Strategic  empathy  requires  acknowledging  the  traumas  
that  Russia  endured  during  the  Chechen  War  while  not  forgetting  the  atrocities  that  it  took  part  
in.  In  effect,  strategic  empathy  does  not  take  sides,  but  rather  considers  both  a  country’s  actions  
and  perceptions.   
  
Act  in  unison  with  allies  and  institutions  
Historically,  alliances  have  always  been  a  critical  part  of  the  international  system,  as  alliances  
allow  nations  to  combine  resources  and  influence,  utilizing  them  in  a  more  impactful  way.  
Especially  in  the  post-WWII  era,  international  institutions  have  become  the  place  where  much  of  
the  discourse  and  solutions  regarding  global  affairs  takes  place.  The  United  States  and  the  West  
are  no  exception,  with  institutions  like  NATO  forming  based  on  concepts  of  collective  security  
and  the  shared  objectives  of  stability  and  prosperity.   
  
Despite  NATO’s  proven  effectiveness  at  preventing  global  conflict,  it  has  largely  failed  to  reign  
in  or  engage  with  Russia.  In  fact,  the  Chechen  Wars  serve  as  examples  in  which  nearly  no  NATO  
involvement  occurred. 91   Russia  has  perceived  NATO’s  silence  as  disinterest  and  as  an  invitation  
to  continue  acting  aggressively  in  the  region  without  consequence.  The  lack  of  European  interest  
in  Chechnya  may  have  allowed  for  continued  cooperation  with  Russia  in  the  short-term;  
however,  in  the  long  term,  its  detachment  signaled  to  Russia  of  the  West’s  “white  flag”  mentality  
towards  matters  within  Russia’s  spheres  of  influence.  NATO’s  lack  of  response  to  the  Chechen  
Wars  has  played  out  dreadfully,  as  Russia  has  felt  empowered  to  act  out  in  Ukraine,  Syria,  and  
elsewhere.   




Effective  alliances  will  likely  help  deter  Russia  from  continued  acts  of  hostility,  though  NATO’s  
relationship  with  Russia  has  taken  a  severe  knock  because  of  Russia’s  invasion  of  Crimea  in  
2014.  NATO’s  outlook  on  Russia  outlines  the  relationship’s  presently  tumultuous  status,  while  
acknowledging  previous  cooperative  efforts  in  various  areas  that  have  served  the  interests  of  both  
sides. 92   Officially,  NATO  has  suspended  cooperation  with  Russia,  though  official  “political  and  
military  channels  of  communication  remain  open”. 93   Despite  NATO’s  valid  response  towards  
Russia  in  light  of  the  situation  in  Crimea,  ignoring  Russia  has  not  proven  to  be  a  successful  
strategy,  as  no-response  does  not  equate  to  a  negative  response.   
  
The  West  has  repeatedly  mistaken  Russia  for  an  actor  operating  by  a  similar  set  of  security  
assumptions.  On  the  contrary,  a  lack  of  response  to  international  provocations  by  Russia  is  a  far  
worse  approach  than  an  appropriate  show  of  force. 94   Instead  of  inaction  and  alienation,  NATO  
must  correct  past  precedents  and  push  back  against  Russian  aggression,  especially  when  directed  
against  weaker  neighboring  countries.  NATO  must  also  harness  the  soft-power  capabilities  of  its  
members  to  draw  Russia  into  negotiation  talks,  thereby  deterring  Russian  aggression  and  
encouraging  progress  through  the  diplomatic  process.   
92  "NATO  -  Topic:  Relations  with  Russia,"  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  (NATO)  
93  Ibid.  
94  Maura  Reynolds ,  Personal  interview,  19  March  2021.  
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VIII.   Conclusion  
The  Chechen  Wars,  which  took  place  between  1994  and  2009,  had  a  profound  impact  on  the  
trajectory  of  the  Russian  state,  as  well  as  on  the  overall  Russian  psyche  and  security  perspective.  
Chechnya’s  dissatisfaction  with  its  territorial  status  after  the  breakup  of  the  Soviet  Union  led  to  a  
rebellion  against  the  new  Russian  Federation  which  ultimately  resulted  in  two  distinct  conflicts  
in  which  clear  lessons  were  identified  and  described.  While  the  lessons  of  Chechnya  may  not  
have  constituted  a  momentous  shift  in  Russian  history,  they  had  and  continue  to  have  an  
enduring  role  in  shaping  the  behavior  of  the  current  Russian  regime.   
  
Opposition  and  dissent  had  a  place  in  Russia  towards  the  end  of  the  Soviet  period  and  the  
beginning  of  the  Federation,  though  the  shift  in  the  relationship  and  use  of  the  media  around  this  
time  marked  an  attempt  by  Russia  to  reassert  authority  over  both  its  territory  and  its  citizens.  The  
shifts  in  the  allowance  of  criticism  in  the  media’s  coverage  of  the  wars  to  a  highly  controlled  
narrative  can  be  interpreted  as  a  preventative  measure  of  future  conflict  and  a  tactical  maneuver  
aimed  at  improving  Russian  response.  The  media  also  served  a  central  role  in  establishing  and  
spreading  the  “Russian”  (i.e.,  government)  narrative  of  the  fight  against  Chechnya  as  a  
counterterrorism  campaign.  By  assuring  favorable  press  coverage  and  issuing  official  statements  
directed  against  Chechnya,  Russia,  led  by  President  Putin,  was  able  to  successfully  change  the  
course  of  the  conflict  and  achieve  victory  after  previously  suffering  defeat  in  the  first  war.  This  
lesson  comes  from  the  application  of  new  methods  in  the  Second  Chechen  War  that  corrected  the  
mistakes  of  the  first,  though  Russia  had  circumstantial  help,  as  the  conflict  evolved  to  include  
more  religious  Islamic  elements. 95    
  
95  James  Hughes,  “ Chechnya:  From  Nationalism  to  Jihad  ”,  p.  94  
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Russia’s  experience  with  a  rogue  republic  soon  after  its  de  facto  creation  had  also  made  it  
hyper-aware  of  the  internal  elements  which  threatened  its  domestic  security,  including  the  
divisive  political  and  religious  sentiment  stemming  from  Chechnya.  The  general  sense  of  unity  
that  had  come  from  the  shared  experiences  of  two  world  wars  and  been  ingrained  in  the  Soviet  
system  had  seemingly  begun  to  wear  off  by  the  time  of  Chechen  Wars,  forcing  Russia  to  
reexamine  its  understanding  of  the  role  of  division  within  its  borders.   
  
By  all  accounts,  Putin  has  made  it  a  priority  to  adopt  a  stance  that  encourages  wider  Russian  
unity  and  prevents  division,  which  includes  consistent  remarks  aimed  at  pitting  Russia  against  
the  United  States  and  the  West.  Such  rhetoric,  while  strategic  in  many  ways,  has  enabled  Putin  to  
prevent  the  emergence  of  domestic  enemies  by  providing  a  foreign  scapegoat.  Division  within  
Russia,  of  which  the  Chechen  Wars  continues  to  be  the  prime  example,  has  become  relatively  
weak  since  the  conflicts,  and  stands  in  direct  contrast  to  the  strong  front  of  unity  pushed  forth  by  
the  Russian  government  today.   
  
By  the  Second  Chechen  War,  the  ineffectiveness  of  Boris  Yeltsin  and  the  lack  of  coherent  
strategy  towards  Chechnya  in  the  first  war  shifted  to  a  strategically  efficient  military  force  with  a  
leader  with  an  adept  understanding  of  conflict.  The  necessity  of  strong  leadership  and  coherent  
policy  composed  the  final  major  lesson  of  Chechnya  and  is  evident  in  the  future  conflicts  and  
general  leadership  style  of  Putin  in  the  years  following.  The  shift  towards  more  elite,  specialized  
fighting  forces  in  both  the  Second  Chechen  War  and  in  the  conflicts  in  Ukraine,  Syria,  and  
elsewhere  in  Russia,  illustrate  that  the  Chechen  Wars  encouraged  Russia  to  be  unbashful  to  the  
use  of  targeted  force.  Putin’s  rise  to  political  power  brought  Russian  foreign  policy  into  closer  
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alignment  with  the  old  tradition  of  the  Soviet  Union,  enabling  a  more  organized  response  to  
conflict  from  the  top-down.  Finally,  the  move  toward  warlordism  as  a  response  to  the  Chechen  
problem  has  echoed  in  other  regions  of  Russia  and  has  served  to  prop  up  Russia’s  perception  of  
internal  and  international  stability.   
  
While  the  typical  portrayal  of  Russia  as  an  aggressor  has  its  validity,  it  is  not  wholly  accurate.  
Unfortunately,  such  a  narrative  ends  up  being  a  reductive  representation  of  a  complex  entity.  In  
accordance  with  historical  continuity  theory,  modern  Russia  has  been  shaped  by  a  long  history  
dating  back  centuries.  Despite  this,  the  recency  of  events  like  the  Chechen  wars  have  an  arguably  
greater  impact  on  the  perspective  of  modern  Russia.   
  
Emphasis  on  continued  research  and  better  understanding  of  adversarial  perspectives,  in  addition  
to  cultivation  of  strategic  empathy,  will  reinvigorate  the  potential  of  the  West-Russia  
relationship.  Coordination  and  cooperation  with  allies  will  help  assure  that  improvements  made  
in  the  relationship  can  remain  steadfast.  Significant  work  lies  ahead  for  both  parties,  as  
overcoming  Cold  War  perceptions  and  rhetoric  will  require  serious  effort.  Progress  can  only  
proceed  slowly,  however,  if  the  Chechen  conflicts  have  proven  anything,  Russia  is  capable  of  
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